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**US ARMY INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED RUSSIAN
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EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES**



STUDENT RESEARCH REPORT

MAJ. DAVID M. GLANTZ
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SURVEY OF SELF-CRITICISM IN
SELECTED SOVIET MILITARY JOURNALS
1977

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Majors David M. Glantz and David J. Sisson /

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
FOREWORD

This special project was prepared by Major David M. Glantz and David J. Sisson, Class of 1977. The report highlights criticisms of the Soviet Army in non-technical fields, as expressed in selected Soviet military publications. While not conclusive in itself, the report describes some of the problems of training, motivation and discipline faced by the Soviet Army.

The authors were assisted by Mr. Gregory M. Viktorov, Professor of Military Science, who provided the initial research from Voennyi Vestnik, Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, and Tyl i Snabzhennie.

This report is a continuation of a pilot project begun in 1975 and will serve as the model for future reports on self criticism of the Soviet military expressed in these key publications.

Comments of the readers are invited and should be addressed to the Commander, U.S. Army Russian Institute, APO New York 09053.


ROLAND LAJOIE
LTC, MI
Commander

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INTRODUCTION

This paper examines Soviet press treatment of current shortcomings and problem areas in nontechnical fields of the Soviet Armed Forces. It is based on a thorough review of three key Soviet military publications listed and described below. These journals were selected as the most important and the most representative of current Soviet military writings.

An essential premise of this research is the belief that meaningful research can be accomplished using widely published Soviet military writings. While it is recognized that the Soviet press contains much propaganda, it must still serve as an important method of communications for a vast armed forces complex. The myriad of problems facing the Soviet military, as any other military force, cannot be dealt with exclusively through communications with limited readership. It is the position of the authors that the Soviets do address real and important problems openly in a number of cases and that a reading and comprehension of these problems is important to a broad understanding of the Soviet military.

A particular characteristic of Soviet writing that should be explained prior to an analysis of this report is that it is normal in Soviet writings to call attention to specific problems by referring to particular units or individuals. Considering the function and the circulation of these periodicals, it seems logical to assume that these problems discussed reflect concern of the military leadership for improvement in various areas.

The following open press Soviet sources have been used as the basis for this research document:

Voennyi Vestnik (Military Herald), Issues 1-12, 1976. A monthly army journal which concentrates its efforts on military training, combat and combat support functions, and military leadership. The primary target audience is the regular and reserve officer corps of the army.

Til i Snabzhenie Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil (The Rear and Supply of the Soviet Armed Forces), Issues 1-12, 1976. A monthly military journal which concentrates its efforts on support organizations and systems of the rear. The primary target audience is regular and reserve officers of the Armed Forces and specialists in combat service support fields.

I N D E X

For simplicity, the following abbreviation are used:

VV = Voennyi Vestnik (Military Herald), T&S = Tyl i Snabzhenie (Rear and Supply), KVS = Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces). Following these abbreviations appear the volume number of the given journal for 1976, the assigned number of each article analyzed within a given volume, and the page number within this work on which article can be found. For example, VV 1-1-1 indicates Voennyi Vestnik, volume 1 for 1976, the first article summarized from that volume, and page 1 of this work.

Command Authority and Respect. VV 3-1-5; VV 7-3-21;
VV 7-4-63.

Discipline (Observing regulations). VV 3-5-8; VV 4-1-9;
VV 6-5-18; VV 7-3-21; VV 7-4-21; VV 8-6-25;
VV 8-13-28; VV 10-6-33; VV 11-6-37; T&S 1-2-41;
T&S 5-3-46; T&S 8-2-52; T&S 8-6-54; T&S 12-1-61;
KVS 9-3-69; KVS 11-1-72; KVS 15-4-79; KVS 18-3-85;
KVS 22-1-89;

Formalism. VV 4-1-9; VV 4-4-11; VV 5-1-14; VV 6-3-17;
VV 6-5-18; VV 7-1-20; VV 7-2-20; VV 8-3-23; VV 9-3-29;
VV 10-2-31; VV 11-1-34; VV 11-6-37; VV 12-3-39;
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T&S 12-3-62; KVS 1-1-62; KVS 2-1-62; KVS 3-1-64;
KVS 3-2-65; KVS 4-1-65; KVS 4-2-65; KVS 5-1-66;
KVS 9-3-69; KVS 9-4-70; KVS 10-1-71; KVS 10-2-71;
KVS 11-1-62; KVS 12-1-74; KVS 13-1-75; KVS 13-3-76;
KVS 15-3-79; KVS 16-2-81; KVS 17-3-82; KVS 18-2-84;
KVS 20-2-86; KVS 24-4-95;

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VV 3-2-6; VV 4-1-9; VV 4-4-11;
VV 5-4-15; VV 5-5-16; VV 6-3-17; VV 6-6-19;
VV 8-6-25; T&S 3-1-44; KVS 3-1-64; KVS 5-1-66;

Friction between first and second year soldiers.
VV 9-2-29; VV 11-6-37;

Indifference to deficiencies. VV 1-1-1; VV 2-3-5;
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VV 8-13-28; VV 9-1-28; VV 10-4-32; VV 10-7-34;
VV 11-2-35; VV 12-4-40; T&S 1-2-41; T&S 5-3-46;
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KVS 10-1-71; KVS 17-3-82; KVS 23-1-91; KVS 23-3-92;

Inflated reports (Eyewash). VV 1-4-3; VV 2-3-5;
VV 7-2-20; VV 8-3-23; VV 9-1-28; VV 10-2-31; VV 11-2-35;
VV 12-1-38; T&S 2-1-43; T&S 11-2-59; KVS 2-2-63;
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VV 6-2-17; VV 6-4-18; VV 6-5-18; VV 7-1-20;
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VOENNYI VESTNIK

Volume I

1. "TAKTICHESKAIA PODGOTOVKA" (Tactical Preparation), pp 2-5.

This issue's editorial discusses training deficiencies during the 1975 training year and goals to be met in the coming year. The attention of some commanders, political workers and party organizations was not sufficiently directed toward the training of individuals and subunits as demanded by Marshal Grechko. Training of subunits was not everywhere consistent with present day requirements. Officers, "warrant officers", sergeants, and staff officers are themselves often poorly trained. In the coming year it is necessary to raise the level of officers' tactical proficiency, find more rational methods of relating academic topics to field training, conduct command and staff exercises on the movement of subunits over unfamiliar terrain using command vehicles and communications in situations which portray a real and strong enemy equipped with the latest military technology and weapons. Crisis situations and extensive use of radio jamming must be emphasized. The time has come to cease conducting exercises based upon previously worked out solutions. There must be condemnation of commanders who evidence a passive and superficial attitude to training exercises.

Many officers who have recently completed military academic institutions are unable to create realistic tactical situations. Thus their subordinates cannot send out patrols and obtain necessary decision making information. The role of the junior leader is now greater than ever due to increased firepower, mobility and the fact that he will often operate detached from his parent unit. Thus he must be taught to act independently. Small unit battle drills must be emphasized.

2. Colonel-General B. Ivanov. "Masterstvo Kuetsia v Pole"(Skill is Forged in the Field), pp 32-36

Colonel-General Ivanov discusses deficiencies in field training and offers suggestions for improvement. Some officers have not joined the struggle to improve the quality of training. They allow over-simplification and conduct maneuvers according to rigid, previously worked out plans and schedules. Some become flustered in crisis situations and spend too much time estimating the situation and reaching a decision. Officers must be taught to find more decisive means of conducting battles. Subunits must be able to fire accurately on the move or from quick halts, fire at greater distances and attack at high speed, quickly change the direction of attack and react to changes in the mission. This can only be accomplished in live fire exercises. Without ammunition, subunits in training normally easily seize objectives and develop the offensive. But issue them ammunition, order them to change directions and seize an unanticipated objective one the speed of advance slows by two or three times or more. To compensate for the lack of an armed enemy, the training situation should be made more complex and more challenging. The complexities of contemporary warfare demand intensive training requiring initiative, creativity, resourcefulness and cunning on the part of commanders.

3. Major-General N. Akimov. "Tsena Predvideniia" (The value of Foresight), pp 36-39

Major General Akimov emphasizes the importance of predicting enemy actions and reacting to them and cites training examples of failures to do this. In a recent training exercise one commander of a motorized rifle battalion poorly organized a roadmarch and incorrectly estimated the situation with regards to possible enemy actions. Halfway through the march he recognized some of his mistakes and gave the order to increase speed which resulted in overextension of the column. March security was slack and no reconnaissance was conducted. The extended column was attacked from an unexpected direction, resulting in heavy losses and failure to complete the mission of the battalion.

In another exercise an attacking motorized rifle battalion successfully penetrated the enemy FEBA and seized several strongpoints. In front of the battalion were several heights, possible reserve positions of the defenders. The battalion commander ignored the possible danger from the heights and failed to determine if

they were occupied. Consequently while the battalion continued the pursuit enemy reserves attacked from the heights and caused the battalion to halt its attack and assume a disadvantageous defensive position.

In still another incident a motorized rifle company commander failed to maintain surveillance and keep abreast of the situation. Consequently his company was rendered ineffective by blundering into a radioactive zone.

4. Major-General of Artillery A. Ganzha. "Stazhirovka Kursantov" (Cadet On-the-Job Training), pp 76-81.

Major General Ganzha, Commandant of the Smolensk Anti-Aircraft Rocket Higher School of Command discusses the importance of and some deficiencies in the program of on the job training for officer-candidates of his institutions. Each year cadets are sent to troop units for practical training. Most participants do well, but others have difficulty. One regiment was not prepared for the arrival of thirty cadets. There were no barracks, bunks, or food gear provided. Upon being informed of the cadets' arrival, the unit commander shrugged his shoulders, then phoned his superior to report that "General Ganzha has smuggled thirty cadets to us for OJT (on-the-job training) and I don't know what to do with them. We are not prepared to receive them". By direction of his superior he accepted the cadets and arranged billeting.

Some unit commanders assign cadets to duties which are not beneficial or related to the training they need. In the Trans-Baikal Military District (okrug) cadets were assigned to subunits and required to supervise construction work. In the Belorussia Military District, one battery commander put cadets to work creating graphic propaganda materials. There is also a problem with evaluation reports of cadets sent back to the institute. Most reports are too vague and repetitive and follow the pattern "Cadet _____, during the execution of assigned duties, displayed initiative and self dependency, fastidiousness with respect to himself and subordinates and skillfully conducted political - instructional work with unit personnel." Such reports have no real use because not all cadets are deserving of praise.

Volume II

1. Lieutenant-General of Tank Forces M. Zaitsev - "Komandirami ne Rozhdaiutsia" (They Are Not Born Commanders), pp 13-17

Lieutenant General Zaitsev reflects on the necessity of intensive, supervised field training for commanders. As an introduction to his article he cites an example of poor tactical leadership he witnessed on maneuvers in 1971. A regiment was given an everyday mission of conducting a night march and attacking a defending enemy from the march. The regimental commander, in his issued order, gave overly specific instructions concerning commitments of reserves, thus curtailing the use of initiative by his subordinates. The march itself was conducted in strict parade formation, as if "following a ruler". One of the battalions attacked deep into the enemy defensive positions and came under enemy tank attack. While the right flank company opened fire on the enemy at maximum range and in good formation, the left flank company became immersed in swampy terrain, lost its orientation, could not assist in repulsing the counterattack, and was itself subjected to flanking fire. In real combat the company would have suffered heavy losses. The battalion commander then made a poor decision which was approved by the regimental commander. The battalion reserve was committed to support the right flank company and the enemy was repulsed. However, no efforts were made to correct the situation on the left flank. At this point the exercise was halted and the commanders were counseled on their poor decisions.

Even after counseling further correction measures were not taken. The general states that senior commanders with combat experience in World War II must constantly observe and correct. During the war such mistakes would have been paid for dearly, "and after all the threat of war exists today".

2. Major A. Novikov. "Delu Partii Verny" (To the Parties Cause We Are Loyal), pp 17-22.

The Assistant to the Chief of the Political Administration of Land Forces for Komsomol affairs, Major Novikov,

praises Komsomol achievements with the military. In the summation, however, he mentions some deficiencies in Komsomol efforts. Some Komsomol members and young soldiers are not fulfilling their socialist duties, and are content with only "satisfactory" appraisals. Komsomol organizations at times neglect the major challenge of the times - the struggle for close coordination between ideological training and the solving of practical problems which arise in regiments and subunits. Komsomol work, especially in the field, is sometimes conducted without application to the achievement of tactical missions. There is at times no evidence of a determined struggle to use training time properly in order to build a solid military collective

3. "Vedushchaia Sila" (The Leading Force), pp 22-26.

Deputy Minister of Defense, Chief Inspector of the Ministry of Defense, Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and member of the Central Committee CPSU, Marshal of the Soviet Union K.S. Moskalenko is interviewed by a correspondent of Voenni Vestnik. The correspondents' questions are obviously leading and concern the role of the party in the military. Marshal Moskalenko emphasizes the importance of tactical skill coupled with political indoctrination and with acts of heroism performed by party members in World War II. In evaluating today's officers, he notes some problems. "Unfortunately, we sometimes encounter while inspecting troops exaggerated inflated reports, lowered standards and obvious eyewash. What have they been looking at? Certainly everything has taken place before their eyes with their silent approval"

Volume 3

1. Lieutenant General I. Blizniuk. "Avtorit et Komandira" (Authority of the Commander), pp 12-15

Chief of the Political Department Airborne Forces Lt General Blizniuk discusses command authority, its source and application. He maintains that the party is the source of a commander's authority and thus he should utilize military political organizations, especially in training. Commanders who fail to do so are doomed to failure. He cites two examples of such failures apparently as a warning to officers who are less than enthusiastic toward political activities within their units. One commander performed excellently and achieved notoriety for his efforts

in achieving combat preparedness. Suddenly his unit degenerated. Combat readiness declined, quality of field training decreased and discipline was loose. It occurred because the officer placed too much faith in his own infallibility and ceased relying on party and Komsomol organizations. He overestimated the true condition of combat and political preparedness and ignored the party committee. Some officers attempt the situation as it existed. The commander was unable to correct the deficiencies, he had lost respect and his words were valueless. Step by step he lost authority and he was finally replaced. General Blizniuk presents another analogous situation to show that the first case was not unique. Such situations which undermine command authority must be uncovered and prevented.

2. Major General of Tank Forces I. Podobed. "Reshenie Komandira" (The Commander's Decision), pp 60-63

Major General Podobed stresses the necessity for tactical commanders to make timely, intelligent decisions and react to quickly changing combat situations. Not all officers are capable of doing this. Many are inflexible and adhere to previously acquired patterns. When the situation changes abruptly, such officers become confused, preoccupied with formulating a new decision and fail to lead their subunits. One motorized rifle battalion commander operating independently over difficult terrain was unable to execute an assigned mission. This was attributed to the commander's failure to analyze the situation and to a faulty decision. He gave an order to attack across low ground, ignoring the fact that the area was covered by deep snow. As a result, the battalion was delayed 35 minutes in attacking its objective. The commander neglected the possibility of putting riflemen on skis behind the tanks. The tanks left the riflemen far behind and had no infantry support in the attack. In addition rifleman improperly used their skis.

There were also logistical deficiencies. It was impossible to effect resupply of ammunition and POL, and the evacuation of wounded soldiers and disabled vehicles. It appeared that the commander remained glued to his map and failed to consider all factors bearing on his decision. More emphasis must be placed on independent decision-making in training. Forces playing the role of enemy must be more energetic. Too often they are passive, indecisive and of no challenge to their opponents. Senior commanders sometimes exert too much

guardianship over their junior officers and even do their job for them while alluding to their youth or inefficiency. This hinders the development of young officers and transforms them into virtual robots.

3. Colonel A. Dmidov. "Gruppovoe Uprazhnenie Noch'iu" (Group Exercise at Night), pp 63-66

Many commanders of tank and motorized rifle battalions while capable of maneuvering their own subunit, are incapable of properly using attachments of artillery, mortars, engineers or chemical troops. Much training time is wasted because the use of such supporting attachments must be explained during an exercise. On one exercise the participating commanders exhibited shortcomings in analyzing enemy capabilities and intentions even after being given sufficient information. The greatest shortcoming in this regard was the inability of some officers to determine whether the enemy would defend or attack.

4. Lieutenant-General N. Levchenko. "Polevaia Vyuchka Spetsialistev Tyla" (Field Training of Logistics Specialists), pp 67-70

Lieutenant General Levchenko, Deputy Chief of the Rear of the Military Forces of the USSR, writes about the need for tactical training of logistics personnel and their realistic incorporation into tactical exercises. There are some commanders whose only concern is that logistics personnel deliver ammunition and fuel and serve hot meals. All too often, they forget that they too must be proficient in tactical skills and contemporary battlefield conditions. Logistical duties on training exercises must be performed proficiently under tactical conditions. One officer in charge of regimental logistics quickly lost contact with subordinates and virtually ceased to lead them due to "weak personal tactical preparedness". Among his junior leaders there was no initiative, creativity or striving to accomplish the mission. This commander poorly trained his subordinates and did little to increase their knowledge. In addition, an inspection found serious faults in the officers supply section. Such problems can be overcome by exercising greater control over logistical functions in the field. Unfortunately field exercises are conducted with little attention paid to their teaching value. Commanders simply observe logistics functions and critique them after the exercise. They must be more active in correcting defects when they occur.

5. Lieutenant-Colonel I. Malisov. "Kurs na Kachestvo - Bor'ba s Nedostatkami" (The Path to Quality - The Struggle with Shortcomings), pp 96-98.

Lieutenant Colonel Malisov ponders the reasons for problems in an engineer battalion. This battalion had always received outstanding ratings, but last year it received only a good rating. The question "why?" became a major topic for discussion at Komsomol and party meetings. It was determined that one subunit of the battalion lost its outstanding rating due to serious violations of discipline. Four other subunits suffered from placidity, permissiveness, complacency, occasional lack of confidence, and even conceit. Officers and sergeants were equally guilty. Within the subunits, the subject of military discipline was neglected. Komsomol members and communists did not set the example for others and little attention was paid to the organization of the troops' leisure time or to socialist competition. Analysis of training progress was superficial. For example, results in the campaign for accomplishment of socialistic obligations were discarded before the new obligations were even announced. Graphic propaganda within companies was performed carelessly. Little attention was paid to the program of proficiency ratings for individual soldiers (klassnost') and few officers knew who participated in that program. One subunit commander had the same third class proficiency rating he received three years ago after finishing school. No attempt had been made to raise it. In his unit there were training deficiencies and a lack of necessary manuals. Some personnel who have served one and one half years in the regiment still do not know types of mines and explosives. The units have achieved outstanding ratings in the past by a crash program of preparation and cramming prior to the inspection. This casts doubt on the validity of an outstanding rating as an indicator of a high degree of readiness. The results of such crash programs do not last for long and result in inconsistent performance of the subunit.

To eradicate such deficiencies, one must adhere to party principles. Communists must correct party members as well as those not in the party. Unscrupulousness leads to misfortune. Some party members allowed a fellow officer to appear in front of his troops while intoxicated. They could have prevented his loss of authority and transfer out of their unit. Instead they were soft and afraid of offending him with the proper words of advice.

Volume 4

1. General of the Army I. Pavlovskii. "Vysokaia Polevaia Vyuchka - Zalog Postoiannoi Boevoi Gotovnosti" (Quality Field Training - the Promise of Enduring Combat Readiness), pp 2-7.

Commander in Chief of Ground Forces, General Pavlovskii generally praises combat readiness and training, but mentions some shortcomings. Not all leaders are paying enough attention to the planning of training, especially in regard to subunits. This problem was evident in Kiev Military District when the value of group exercises for training officers was underestimated. Not enough attention is paid to the distruction of many anti-tank weapons and organizing defenses against enemy penetrations. Some officers are too devoted to the use of the frontal attack and fail to make proper use of reconnaissance amid terrain while attacking. There are instances where training is hastily conducted without adequate preparation in the inclusion of all complex problems confronting a unit in battle. Too often planned patterns are used in organizing training. This stifles creativity. Units which conduct training by too brief a period cannot avoid stereotyped patterns and are unable to work out problems arising in the field.

There are problems with respect to hastily worked out marches, march security and the conduct of meeting engagements, which are not being satisfactorily solved. On one operation in the Kiev Military District, a night occupation of a rest area was conducted in daylight. The crossing of difficult terrain was poorly executed, as was maintenance and refueling of vehicles. This resulted in late arrival of the regiment involved. Traffic control points were poorly utilized especially at rail crossing and fords, and the march column was poorly policed. Engineer units could not cope with the task of snow removal, and the required rate of march was hindered.

Some officers place primary emphasis on classroom studies, and not enough on field training. The ensuing lack of reaction tends to hurt unit performance. Many instructors in subunit do not use the full array of teaching techniques and training aids. Hence personnel do not receive full knowledge of weapons and employment technique and must later "catch up" in their technical mastery. Training of "warrant officers", and sergeants is in some places conducted irregularly and on a low technical level. Frequently such training disrupts the work of the squad leader with his subordinates.

Command and control of training at each link in the chain of command must be exact, distinct and expert. Some units plan training well but then allow blunders in its execution. Some staff officers neglect progressive methods of parallel work and subsequently waste time in fulfilling their mission.

Lack of control is evidenced by headquarters, which adopt the principle of "signed - that's done, thank goodness". They neglect the important aspect of checking to ensure that orders are fulfilled on time.

Study and implementation of the new regulations is often conducted formally, by recited lectures not responsive to the actual life of the military collective. Since units have not eliminated formalism in the organizing of competition, they still stress quantitative indices and at times give undeserved rewards of excellence. This harms military education by depriving participants of an authentic orientation in their competition. This is evident in the awarding of specialty class levels (Klassnost'). On occasion, specialty levels are awarded to those who do not deserve them, on the basis of an evaluation under simplified conditions.

2. Major General N. Goncharov. "Vysokii Dolg Kommunista" (The High Duty of a Communist), pp 12-16,

Major General Goncharov writes about the implementation of directives of the Twenty-Fifth Party Congress concerning the improvement of military preparedness by winter training and the role of Communists in that training. While most Communists are striving to fulfill these responsibilities, some are not. One battalion showed up at a firing range without training ammunition. Several Communists tried to hide the omission. The party committee intervened, and at a meeting, the guilty unit commander explained measures undertaken to improve training in the subunit.

3. Colonel General D. Grinkevich. "Upravlenie Voiskami - Na Uroven Sovremennikh Trebovani" (Command of Troops - On a Level of Contemporary Demands), pp 47-51.

Colonel General Grinkevich, Chief of Staff Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, writes about the growing complexity of command and control of forces in light of improving military technology. Command techniques must evolve

to a degree commensurate with that increasing complexity. He stresses the importance of firmness in decision-making, high professional and moral quality of officers, flexibility in face of rapidly changing conditions, continued work, secrecy of actions and organization of staff and command work. At times these qualities are absent. Some commanders inadequately define staff responsibilities, resulting in inefficiency. Orders to subunits are late, insufficient time is allowed for their execution, and existing communications means are not fully used. Teaching techniques are sometimes inefficient and neglectful of modern aspects of warfare. Decisions are made by commanders in the "old manner", gathering and evaluation of information pertaining to the situation is often slow sequencing and reflects poor. In particular, some commanders halt their units in order to clarify their missions and make decisions. This consumes critical time and leads to mission failure through tardiness. One commander, after completing a successful penetration of enemy lines, was confronted with the task of redeploying to meet a small counterattack. He halted his unit, wasted considerable time on his decision, failed to give timely or appropriate orders to subunits, neglected proper reconnaissance and coordination of initial support, and consequently was delayed in fulfilling his mission. All this was due to poor sequencing and coordination of staff work, poorly trained staff officers, and lack of quick reaction to the situation by the commander. He also forgot that battle is a combined force operation utilizing all the technical material means of command. The faults exhibited by the commander and staff can be eliminated only by the improved tactical preparation of commanders and staff officers to cope with modern battles under field conditions.

4. Lieutenant General M. Plokhov. "Reshitelno Borot'sia s Shablonom" (To Decisively Struggle with Patterns), pp 51-55.

Lieutenant General Polokhov, Assistant Commander of Forces for Military Training, Leningrad Military District, warns against the danger of adhering closely to patterns in training. This type of formalism ignores the numerous changing environmental and combat conditions facing any force. He advises that realism be incorporated into training. He cites cases where seemingly well conceived plans were disrupted by changing conditions. One company was required to operate in the winter midnight darkness under polar conditions. The unit commander failed to anticipate special measures, including light security. Oversimplification in training perniciously damages the level of training. The chief reason that commanders do not create conditions on exercises which would call for resourcefulness

initiative and decisiveness of subordinates is that the commanders themselves are limited by formal orders which do not address existing conditions. The evaluation of the exercise is based simply on firing results alone. Such exercises do not indicate true state of training in subunits and the ability of subunit commanders. These commanders cannot determine the real skill level of subordinates. Often the formalism and adherence to pattern is subtle and hidden to the eye. For example, in an exercise involving an attacking unit, the unit advanced engaged pop-up targets in the open, and penetrated the enemy defense. The targets were easy to hit and came down in a given sequence regardless of whether they were in fact hit. The unit then proceeded to advance. The overall assumption is that all bullets hit and all attacks succeed, all units advance simultaneously, and fire at the same time. All commanders worry about is the maintenance of unit alignment and safety precautions. These practices are totally unrealistic.

General Polokhov visited a tank company which was conducting a night attack. According to the plan, practiced the day before, a counterattack was planned from the left. However it came from the right and caught the unit unprepared. This adherence to pattern caused deplorable results. Units operating on unfamiliar terrain are often at a loss. When exercises are conducted under realistic conditions, with realistic targets, units achieve lower evaluations. This benefits the participants. Only realism teaches.

5. Colonel General C. Molokoedov. "V Planirovanii Osnova Uspekha" (In Planning - The Basis of Success), pp 59-62

Colonel General Molokoedov, Assistant Chief Inspector of the Ministry of Defense, stresses the importance of military and political training of troops and the role of commanders in that process. While the author discusses planning, training of officers, dissemination of war experience, socialist competition and the building of training and material base, he focuses on planning of training and notes some deficiencies. Often training is not properly sequenced and the subunit suffers the most. The basic training of squads and platoons is overloaded or curtailed, and commanders immediately move to company or battalion training. Subunit training is "forced" as commanders prepare for previously announced higher level exercises. The entire unit's performance suffers. Some commanders neglect the teaching of basic firing skills in order to prepare a unit for firing at a given range, at given targets, at a given time. This unit does well

on that range but cannot do well under different conditions. Such a unit will display mixed uneven results on exercises. In some units training plans of the parent unit do not correspond with plans of the subunit. In other units, commanders ignore the already established training plan. There is nothing more dangerous than a subordinate who does not believe in the plan which is in effect the order of the commander. Often the training of officers, warrents officers and sergeants is out of phase. While the subunit works on platoon subjects, the sergeant is working on squad subjects. In addition, some commanders formally approve the training plan without really knowing what is in it.

6. Colonel V. Ivanov. "V Voенно-uchebnykh Zavedeniiakh - Uluchshat' Metodiku Prepodavania" (In Military Schools to Improve the Method of Teaching), pp 84-86.

Colonel Ivanov discusses the increasing quality of student work in military college and the effectiveness of methods of instruction in light of scientific and technical progress. While traditional forms of teaching in military college (lectures, group exercises, seminars, independent work) are all suitable to current needs, unfortunately they are not always skillfully organized and utilized. A visit to one institution showed that talk of quality and effectiveness was only idle conversation. Actually, studies were primitive, boring, superficial and conducted on a pattern which inhibited the development of creative thought. There was poor control over field studies conducted in the classroom. Some teachers poorly planned their time and use of material. Experiences of WWII and imperialist local wars as well as field experiences of soldiers were not exploited. Subjects were shallow in content, dry, and out of touch with life. There was a lack of initiative in emulating the practices of successful schools and faculties.

Volume 5

1. "Povyshat' Slazhehnost Melkikh Podrazdelenii" (To Increase the Coordination of Small Subunits), pp 2-5

This editorial cites the important role that subunits play in combat situations. It emphasizes the need for good training, political motivation, and harmonious interaction between subunits in light of increased firepower of unit and increase possibility of independent operations by subunit. Some deficiencies were noted during the KAVKAZ exercise which should be remedied. In some companies platoons, and squads, training in preparation for the exercise was hasty and conducted in oversimplified conditions without sufficient material supplies. Commanders did not properly sequence their training or completely prepare their subordinate commanders. In one company on a training exercise, partial plans were prepared for an attack. But the commander overlooked such essentials as determining the fire means of the enemy, assessing the obstacles barriers confronting his unit, planning the directive of attack of each tank and coordinating the mutual action of his and neighboring units. The commander did not specify what targets to attack with artillery and when, and what signals and radio call signs would be used. He failed to coordinate with tank commanders and acquaint his subordinates with all aspects of the mission. As a result some soldiers and NCO's never knew the battle mission and how to fulfill it. Ultimately the attack was conducted in formal array by rectilinear movements of tanks obviously vulnerable to enemy fire. True assessment of training was difficult in such a formal exercise.

2. Major General P. Tovstukhs. "Visokaia Shtabnaia Kul'tura - Zalog Uspekha v Upravlenii Voiskami" (High Staff Efficiency - a Pledge of Success in Command of Forces), pp 24-27

Major General Tovstukha addresses the matter of raising staff efficiency of officers to meet the modern demands of warfare. While assessing the staff work during the KAVKAZ exercise the author tempers his praise by citing some shortcomings among commanders and staff officers. One commander "worried and fussed" while making hasty estimates. Ultimately he compared enemy and friendly units mechanically, without considering such differences as weapons and material. A battalion commander and his Chief of Staff inaccurately determined march time of stretched out units on the march

by use of a slide rule although measuring instruments and compasses were available. Issued orders were frequently amended and clarified, and radio communications were conducted unskillfully. Unnecessarily long conversations and wordiness litters the airways and diverts the attention of subordinates from their mission.

Some commanders of inefficient staffs resorted to shouting, rudeness and dressing down of subordinates. There were officers who do not know how to work with maps, to plot conditions and their decisions.

3. Major N. Bakhtin. "Boevaia Strel'ba Vzvoda na BMD" (Military Firing of the Platoon on the BMD), pp 43-46

Guards Major Bakhtin uses the example of platoon exercises to emphasize the importance of live firing in training. He writes that there are some platoon leaders who fail to utilize proper fire training to develop tactical mastery. Battalion and company commanders fail to control and check practice firing to insure that it is realistic. Often targets are arranged on lines, not masked by a background of a natural area. Often conditions on the target range are uninformative. Enemy actions, when present, are weak, passive and unrealistic. All this leads to simplification and indulgence in military firing, lowers its value, and creates in instructors and commanders a premature picture of contemporary battle.

4. Major General B. Kharchuk. "Uchit' a ne Podmenivat' " (To Teach but Not Substitute), pp 49-53.

Major General Kharchuk, of the Tank Forces discusses the tendency of senior commanders to stifle the initiative of junior officers by making decisions for them, thus slowing their professional development. One young lieutenant was given the mission of analyzing a problem in the presence of his battalion commander. The battalion commander, in seeking a high evaluation, interrupted and made the decision himself. This deprived the lieutenant of experience and left him dissatisfied. This unfortunate practice results from lack of faith in the ability of subordinates, fear of failure, and desire to show the brilliance of the unit. The result is slow mastery of the art of command by junior officers and a habit of looking to superiors for decisions. Many junior officers deliberately defer decisions to their commanders. The unit of a certain captain performed well while he deferred to the help of his superior. However, when required to perform independently on an inspection, the unit did poorly. A tank company did well in day exercises, but on a night operation it lost one platoon and did poorly.

This was because all day operations were planned on a pattern created by the battalion staff. The company commander could not operate under night conditions, without constant instruction. Another platoon leader frontally attacked a superior enemy force and lost. The battalion commander gave him a good evaluation for ferocity. Such tactless renunciation of basic principles can lead to serious mistakes and miscalculation.

5. Marshal G. Peredel'skii. "Takticheskaya Podgotovka Raketchikov i Artilleristov" (The Tactical Training of Rocket and Artillery Troops), pp 66-72

By using the experiences of winter maneuvers Marshal Peredel'skii, Commander of Rocket and Artillery Forces of Ground Force, emphasizes the importance of rocket and artillery training. While complementing most units on their performance he notes some deficiencies in officer training made apparent by the exercises. Often units conduct exercises hurriedly, according to previously established patterns without proper assignments of missions to subunits. Changing battle conditions created confusion among commanders. One company commander operating with tanks in an unfamiliar area was unable to adapt himself to changing conditions. He failed to use his staff properly, he could not handle a change in the existing pattern, and he failed in his mission.

Often in a given exercise, specialists, radio and telephone operators, scouts, are left with nothing to do. All persons must be tested in exercises. The culmination of training is joint operations requiring mutual support. Some commanders pay it little attention. A battalion commander in an exercise attached without informing his supporting artillery of the boundaries and tempo of attack. Thus the advance of unit and supporting fires were not coordinated. Forces could not be shifted forward and the battalion lost artillery support. Mistakes are allowed in the calculation of time of occupation of firing positions usually because of ignorance of locality and march routes. Commanders often utilize too much time making decisions and leave subordinates too little time for execution.

1. "Voenno-Tekhnicheskii Krugozor Ofitsera" (Military-Technical Outlook of an Officer), pp 2-5.

This lead article stresses the necessity for all officers to possess sufficient technical knowledge to cope with the demands of modern warfare. The existence of distinct problems indicates that officers should continually read and study literature on advanced and basic sciences. Commanders spend much time consulting with specialists on elemental questions. Demands of war do not allow such a waste of time. Lack of knowledge leads commanders into giving impossible missions to artillery and aviation on exercises. One commander on an exercise fired a five minute preparation on dug in enemy anti-tank weapons on dominating terrain and then attacked. The time was obviously insufficient and the attack failed. Some officers retain the old-fashioned belief that only certain officers need technical training. Unfortunately, instruction in some institutions is unrealistic, haphazard and insufficient. Thus some commanders cannot check equipment, utilize weapons or communications and special equipment. Techniques to check the knowledge of officers are not fully used. Additional courses are not established and officers are not acquainted with the criteria of evaluation and exams. The quality of lectures is low and unit conferences are hastily conducted and inefficient.

2. Major-General I. Skorodumov and Colonel M. Mant. "Organizatsiia Boia v Ogranichennoe Vremia" (Organizing for Battle in a Limited Time), pp 17-22

Major General Skorodumov and Colonel Mant of Tank Force stress the importance of time in organizing for battle. Commanders and staff officers should simultaneously work out and disseminate plans so that subunits can begin to plan based on advanced information. A time study run by the authors for preparing a battalion, company and platoon for battle unearthed some deficiencies. In one battalion, the ill-trained commander did not give advanced word of the mission and decision to his subordinates. When the decision was made, there was insufficient daylight remaining for the platoons and squads to fulfill their responsibilities. In the meantime, subunits temporized and organized the battle on dummy terrain.

3. Major General V. Samoilenko. "Politrabötnik na Ucheniakh" (A Political Worker on an Exercise), pp 38-41

Major General Samoilenko, Chief of the Political Administration of the Ural Military District, discusses the role of

the party and political officer in raising the moral, political and psychological level of the soldier, thus better preparing him for battle. Some political officers display deficiencies in their work with commanders and soldiers. They evidence formalism, adherence to patterns, over simplification and indulgence in regard to their work with soldiers. They ignore new, living practices. One lieutenant and his unit, while on a firing exercise, spent one and one-half hours repairing targets. Their firing was lackadaisical and the lieutenant had no stopwatch. Political education was ignored, Komsomol members were not used and there was no competition between units. Some political workers, due to inexperience, fail to show proper concern for raising of officer and NCO skill levels, for further party or Komsomol organizational work. They replaced seminars with meetings, did not go down to subunits and instructed officers in the midst of exercises, while having no idea what was going on.

4. Colonel I. Dynin. "Slova Pered Boem" (Words Before Battle), pp 42-45.

Colonel Dynin discusses the value of inspirational words delivered by commanders to their men prior to an exercise or battle. He points out that some commanders do not fully appreciate their value. Some commanders think that their job is simply to organize for battle, that political education is only the job of political officers. They don't think about what they should say to troops when and with what tone. Thus one commander before an exercise vividly told his drivers about a former auto accident. It so scared his men that they drove slowly on the exercise and were late in arriving at the assembly area. He unwittingly spoiled the mood of his soldiers by intimidating them instead of raising their spirit. Other commanders warn officers and soldiers that "A commission from Moscow is checking us. . . so remember. . ." Thus the unit prepared for the wrong reasons.

5. Colonel V. Kovalenko. "Ne Prostaia Formal'nost' " (Not a Simple Formality), pp 53-55.

Colonel Kovalenko uses the occasion of the issuance of new regulations to point out some misuses in the application of punishment and rewards in the maintenance of discipline by company grade officers. His major concern is simplistic formal application of regulation by some officers.

Correct or incorrect application is evidenced by entries in the military book of soldiers (ticket) which is authenticated by unit commanders. Some commanders underestimate the educational value of rewards and awards for duties performed. Often such rewards are few in number and unrelated to military achievements. "One often sees rewards for kitchen work". In one company two corporals were in the unit one and one half years without one award. Though the commander said they deserved none, it turned out that both participated very successfully in exercises and on detached duty. This commander ignored the individual work of subordinates, failed to teach subordinate officers and NCO's the value of awards and did not check the military ticket when he signed it. This formalism impacts harmfully on the soldier and his morale. Regulations also specify removal of punishment as a form of reward. Yet a sergeant displayed good service for six months and his punishment for an infraction remained unchanged. Tickets also show cases where punishment is removed after a few days, whereas regulations require its removal only after its educational value has been realized.

Some commanders fail to end information about honors received to soldiers' home towns or former places of employment. Notations in military tickets are often untimely or simply forgotten. Photos of honor being received are omitted. Sergeants frequently do not use rights granted to them by regulations, and officers often make all entrees pertaining to punishments, thus depriving subordinates of authority and independent action.

6. Colonel C. Bulyzhkin. "Ognevaia Podgotovka Zenitnykh Podrazdelenii" (Firing Training of Antiaircraft Subunits), pp. 85-89

Colonel Bulyzhkin evaluates the firing ability of antiaircraft units and methods of controlling antiaircraft fires. While praising most units for their competency, he notes some exceptions. Some units are poorly prepared to fire because of seasonal variations in performance, insufficient utilization of training apparatus for use in troublesome firing conditions, underestimation of the role of training firing, and oversimplification of the organization, conduct and evaluation of record firing. Daily command and staff control of firing was weak or totally absent. Often training was too infrequent and did not take place under complex air and electronic conditions.

Thus units engage in hurried, dangerous training before exercises while trying to catch up. This results in poor training and low evaluations. One battery on its arrival at an exercise, instead of going into camp as usual, was sent to record fire. This unit was used to simplified conditions and failed when confronted with complicated ones. Other units showed similar failings.

Volume 7

1. "Vsemerno Razvivat' Sotsialisticheskoe Sorevnovanie" (To Develop Socialist Competition in Every Possible Way), pp 2-5

This lead article emphasizes the importance of socialist competition in achieving improved and perfected military training. By analyzing the summer exercises of the Port Arthur Regiment, the article surfaces some problems in the attaining of socialist competition. Some officers and sergeants are not fulfilling accepted obligations to organize such competition. They work in spurts instead of constantly and with generalities rather than concrete themes. In the Central Asien Military District, for example, a group of companies decided to drive for outstanding results. Good intentions failed because commanders and Komsomol members became bogged down in numbers, indicators, tables and lists (fruits of formalism in competition). One company excelled, the other two received low ratings. Many commanders fail to publicize the feats of their men. Others sum up the results of competition irregularly and superficially, using such catch phrases as "All OK, subject deeply mastered but not without deficiencies, etc). This perverts realization of true results of competition. Some officers do not worry about a comparison of results. Thus they do not know the success of rival units and which platoon or companies are stronger or weaker. That becomes apparent only at the end of exercises when it is too late to correct deficiencies. Thus in maneuvers some crews and squads failed to reach the required level of achievement because of training deficiencies.

2. Major General A. Kliuev "V Interesakh Polevoi Vyuchki (In the Interests of Field Training), pp 11-15

Major General Kliuev, Assistant Chief of Political Administration of Ground Forces, on the occasion of summer exercises discusses the role of party workers

in raising the spirit and level of devotion of troops in the field. Their success was tempered by several deficiencies. In a motorized rifle company of the Tamanski Guards Division hurried preparations were used instead of systematic preparation. Political workers knew about it but they sacrificed good preparations for eyewash and temporary gains. Unfortunately there are still political officers and workers who embrace formalism and unobjectively evaluate existing situations. They rely on cumbersome plans of exercises and firing and forget about reality in the checking of performance.

3. Lieutenant Colonel I. Plakhotnick "Trebovatel'nost Strogaia Otecheskaia" (Strict, Paternal Insistence on High Standards), pp. 25-28

Lieutenant Colonel Plakhotnick emphasizes the necessity for officers to insist on high standards as the basis for maintaining discipline and high preparedness. He notes that some commanders fail to do so. One inexperienced senior lieutenant began to allow familiarity, violation of dress codes and to use material rather than moral stimuli. On a tactical problem soldiers were promised a valuable present and leave to their homes if the unit was successful. Thus, simple promise of material gain replaced soldierly obligations to country and regulations as a prod to success. Other commanders acted similarly. Gradually such actions led to concern over internal order rather than military and political training. Regulations also oblige officers to set the example with high personal standards. Some fail to do so forgetting that a soldier acts thus and so because his commander violates established standards.

4. Captain N. Kikeshev. "Chtoby ne Okazat'sia na Obochine" (In Order That One Not Find Himself on the Wayside), pp 63-65

Captain Kikeshev responds to an earlier article which discusses how an officer secures authority and respect. He maintains that an officer's performance influences the degree of respect accorded him by subordinates. On occasion, officers do not obtain this respect because of poor training, personality faults or failure to keep their word. For example one officer who wanted a civilian job on a whim attended military school. He became an officer by chance. His unsuitability morally and physically) was apparent when he graduated and obtained command of platoon. His indifference to military

matters ultimately lead to reprimands, reduction in rank and exclusion from the service. Another officer was arrogant and overly opinionated. This insolence led to conflict with commanders, contemporaries, and subordinates. Eventually he lost faith in himself. The collective could have helped him but did not.

5. Colonel I. Poliakov and Colonel A. Bulatov. "Pro-tivovozdushnaia Oborona v Batalione" (Antiaircraft Defense in the Battalion), pp 84-82.

The authors discuss an antiaircraft exercise defense for a reinforced battalion against a helicopter attack and defense of a column in open terrain. The exercise demonstrated the readiness of the unit to defend against low level targets. However it suffered casualties because the defenders were not dug in. For defense of occupied areas against helicopters which fire rockets and machine guns, the defending motorized infantry must be provided with trenches.

Volume 3

1. Colonel-General G. Salmanov. "Uluchshat' Podgotovky Serzhantov" (To Improve the Training of Sergeants), pp 2-6

Colonel-General Salmanov Assistant to the Commander in Chief of Ground Forces for Military Training, states that modern warfare requires a cadre of well trained NCO's who can make independent decisions. While the Soviet system strives to achieve that goal, some deficiencies exist in the training program. Some training units, which are supposed to impart basic skills to NCO's, suffer from low quality tactical training. They fail to use the existing technical materials and instead rely on stories. They often tolerate the mistakes of students without eliminating them. This reflects upon the qualification and suitability of training of unit commanders. In one unit there was insufficient stress placed on the inculcation of commander's qualities, the importance of socialist competition and the necessity to precisely follow regulations. Thus many students following graduation had difficulty in teaching subordinates. In some units tactical training in the field is shoddy or non-existent. One unit had two exercises in three and one half months. In addition there is often no delineation between the function of sergeant and a commander, the sergeant is deprived of time for self-study and socialist competition is poorly organized. Trust help develop responsibility. But in some units that trust is not given. Many limitations are placed on sergeants stifling their initiative and independence and overloading

officers with work. In turn the sergeant tends to turn to the officer on all questions and loses the respect of subordinates. Some sergeants display lack of tact, engage in familiarity with the troops, and ignore skillful use of disciplinary rights. They either are deprived of these rights by officers or simply do not use them. All these deficiencies reflect poorly on the ability of commanders to create correct command relationships.

2. Colonel General I. Tretiak. "Boevye Zadachi Reshat' Tvorcheski" (To Creatively Solve Military Missions), pp 11-14

Colonel-General Tretiak discusses the need for Commanders to be flexible in battle, to utilize varying methods to take advantage of changing conditions, to avoid ossification, formalism and patterns, and to display initiative and self-reliance. An evaluation of affairs in the Belorussian Military District illustrates his point and spells out some deficiencies. Some officer do not bother with independent search for information about the enemy. They simply wait for information from superiors. Contrarily, some superior officers provide such liberal amounts of information to subordinates that the subordinates rely totally on it. Both conditions stifle initiative. One attacking subunit of a tank regiment successfully performed its day's mission and prepared to continue the attack the next day. That night the senior commander worked out the mission and plans of the subunit. When on the following day conditions changed, the subordinate subunit commander was unable to cope. The unit was attached piecemeal and unsuccessfully. The subunit commander evidenced lack of flexibility caused by practices of the senior commander.

3. Lieutenant-General A. Debaliuk. "Splay Slova i Dela" (Fusion of Words and Practices), pp 15-19.

Lieutenant-General Debaliuk, Chief of the Political Administration Belorussian Military District, stresses the importance of psychological, ideological and political education of the troops to raise their level of inspiration and devotion to duty. He finds fault with such efforts in some units. While most political workers do their job well and combine education work with actual missions, in some units officers approach their jobs formally. They work passively, neglect mistakes, conceal deficiencies and violations of discipline, and simply record that the necessary work is done. In one motorized rifle company, all appeared in order until an inspection occurred. The unit commander engaged in eyewash. Firing training was especially bad. The commander used falsifi-

cation and inflated indicators of competition. The battalion party representatives did not condemn the commander or political representatives of the company because their responsibility of unity of subunit, etc., was fulfilled. But all was done simply formally without regard to the basic mission. Many commanders then talk of dedication to service and training but give no concrete examples. Many commanders are too liberal and remain aloof from actually organizing work. One of the reasons why decisions are made only on paper is excessive guardianship of subordinates by senior officers. The multitudes of directives interfere with regular work, and many are unnecessary.

4. Colonel D. Dorozhkin. "Obuchenie Ofitserov Organizatsii Boia na Mestnosti" (Training of Officers Organization of Battle on the Ground), pp 19-22.

Colonel Dorozhkin finds deficiencies in the training of battalion and subunit officers to evaluate battle conditions and react to rapidly changing situations. It reflects a weak mastery of tactics and a tendency to allow mistakes. Often there is a reluctance to translate knowledge into practical habits in organizing battle. On one exercise the officers of the unit were afraid to break away from a map and adapt to changing conditions. They focused on the original mission and stale instructions and in a group would not show initiative. When making decisions officers seriously jumped from one question to another without finishing either, thus wasting much time. One officer ordered to conduct a march and attack, missed several security and antiaircraft measures. An air attack occurred and he could not cope with it. He later failed to give missions on the orders to attached artillery and mortar units.

5. Lieutenant Colonel V. Kultiasov. "Bol'she Samostoitel'nosti Komandiram" (More Independence to Commanders), pp 26-28.

Lieutenant Colonel Kultiasov emphasized the importance of training officers to make mature independent decisions when faced with changing conditions. This is particularly true of small unit commanders. An examination of engineer unit in the Belorussia Military District shows that there are differences in this regard. Junior officers, warrant officers, and NCO's often play the role of passive executors on exercises. Some senior commanders patronize either or replace subordinates, rendering them untrustworthy or lacking in initiative. An engineer company on exercise produced untimely low quality work because of the commander and his subordinates wanted four orders from above. An engineer platoon leader was ordered to install an underwater bridge over a narrow river. Usually his company commander

supervised but not this time when the river bottom turned out too rocky to drive in piles. The platoon leader wasted valuable time trying to find his commander for orders. Finally the bridge was finished late because of his lack of initiative. Another unit commander similarly delayed in putting in an antitank mine field. Ultimately his delay forced him to install the mines under enemy fire. In combat he would have failed.

6. Lieutenant General A. Kliuev. "Neotlozhnie Zadachi Podgotovki Ofiterskikh Kadrov". (Urgent Tasks of Training Officer Cadres), pp 29-32.

Lieutenant General Kliuev, Assistant to the Commander in Chief of Ground Forces for Colleges, Chief of Colleges of Ground Forces, discusses attempts to improve the already good army educational system by eliminating deficiencies and raising the political, scientific, and moral level of all courses. In some schools faults exist in planning. Much time is wasted because there is improper sequencing of studies. Often administration avoid teaching in complex battle situations. Students are overguarded, thus threatening development of decisiveness, zeal, and thoughtfulness. Some administration engage in trifles, others are poor models of discipline and adherence to regulations. Many teachers and commanders themselves do not know regulations well. Thus some schools do not meet contemporary demands. New means of evaluating teachers are needed to weed out those who adhere to old patterns, habits and methods. Attention must be paid to the self training of students which is now the weakest part of the system.

7. Colonel I. Parshutkin. "Na Glavnom Napravlenii" (In the Main Direction), pp 32-35.

Colonel Parshutkin describes the operation of the Smolensk Antiaircraft Command School and how it transforms the decisions of the Twenty-fifth Party Congress into reality by improving political education. While the most modern methods of education are used (film, tape recordings) there are some deficiencies present. Some lectures and speeches especially of young teachers are overly scholastic and almost unintelligible. Some students would not reach deep conclusions on generalization and were unable to relate material taught with the real needs of the country and the mission of the army. In some student collectives, a spirit of investigation, mutual help, and creative activity was absent. Much need to be done to encourage independent and in-depth study.

8. Lieutenant Colonel I. Ahimov and Lieutenant Colonel A. Dvorianchikov. "Vospitanie Initsiativy" (Education of Initiative), pp 35-38.

Lieutenant Colonel Akimov and Dvorianchikov, former teachers at Ulianovsk Guards Tank Command School, emphasize the value of independent creative action by officers on the battlefield and resourcefulness of every officer. Though all study at the institute is aimed at instilling every officer with these qualities some problems exist. The authors use several exercises to illustrate the problems. One student leading a tank reconnaissance platoon against an enemy position failed to utilize camouflage and advanced under fire across an open area while a wooded approach was available. His tank was destroyed. To thwart the problem of students making group decisions the authors created a system of separating students by three to five paces after they were given a problem to analyze. On another exercise, an attending tank company commander was threatened by a false counterattack, followed by a real one. The fully confused commander conducted a lengthy radio conversation to find out what happened, while his tank remained stationary in open terrain. Some teachers needlessly supervise and protect students. Even in well thought-out exercises, they clarify the problem and work out each aspect of it for the student. This creates dissatisfied students who display no initiative.

9. Major-General A. Averianov. "Sovershenstvuiia Metodicheskoe Masterstvo". (Perfecting Methodical Mastery), pp 39-41.

Major General Averianov discusses teaching practices at the Kalinin Artillery Academy aimed at the education of educators and improvement of teaching qualities of instructors. He stresses the value of detailed training and independent work in an atmosphere of objective investigation, and finds some room for improvement in the present system. In particular, he describes one offensive exercise which exhibited numerous flaws. Artillery support, target selection, and sequencing were haphazard. Second echelon units and the tank reserve were used against a counterattack while first echelon units could have repulsed the attack. Thus the commander was deprived of the possibility of expanded offensive operations.

10. Colonel K. Titakov. "Vnezapnost' - Kliuch k Pobede". (Suddenness - Key to Victory), pp 46-49.

Colonel Titakov evaluates the value of surprise on the battlefield. To benefit from surprise commanders must

be able to utilize their forces, avoid patterns, be constructive in organizing for battle, analyze existing conditions, foresee pending changes, and understand enemy tactics. Some commanders do not possess these qualities. One motorized rifle company commander in a military engagement successfully forced the enemy to deploy. In the ensuing action too much time was spent making a decision and issuing vague orders. Initiative was lost because of the waste of time. Some commanders on an offensive exercise failed to analyze the march route, weather, and time considerations. As a result, they arrived late at attack positions. Often in attacks, commanders fail to exploit success. They are content to bring up second echelon units and secure superiority in forces, thus neglecting the exploitation of earlier successes.

11. Lieutenant General M. Tiagunov. "Operativnost' v Upravlenii Voiskami". (Operativeness in the Control of Forces), pp 49-53.

Lieutenant General Tiagunov, Chief of Staff of the Pre-Carpathian Military District, responds to an earlier article written by Colonel General Grinchevich on the subject of staff efficiency. Energetic control presupposes commander ability to coordinate staff work, reach timely decisions based on changing conditions and issue clear orders. Some headquarters, however, do not reflect the ideal situation. There are problems of transmission of orders and other documents by technical means of communication. The volume of information issued during the heat of battle is so great that it is difficult to handle by existing means. Forces on exercises are sometimes poorly organized. One commander, having been ordered to attack, did not transmit sufficient information to subordinates and support units. Consequently, when radio communication was disrupted by the battle, control was destroyed and subordinates did not know how to react on their own initiative.

12. Lieutenant Colonel T. Zuev and Major I. Balakirov. "V Bor'be za Effektivnost' Strel'by" (In the Struggle for Effective Firing), pp 55-58.

Lieutenant Colonel Zuev and Major Balakirov discuss firing techniques from the BMD (airborne infantry combat vehicle) and cite some problems which must be remedied. The soldiers of one battalion achieved poor results in firing on moving targets due to an inability to make corrections for the movement of the target and one's own vehicle. This indicates low mastery on the part of junior commanders and sergeants and miscalculations in their training.

13. Lieutenant General G. Zakharov. "Molodym Ofitseram Zabotu i Vnimanie" (Care and Attentiveness to the Young Officers), pp 63-66.

On the occasion of the graduation of new officers from military school, Lieutenant General Zakharov reflects on training procedures and the reception which these new officers receive from unit commanders. He notes that there are problems in the way that new officers are treated which impact negatively on their future development. Some units hold meetings, conversations, and lectures for new officers, but neglect practical studies. Often new officers miss these meetings for a variety of reasons. Commanders do not differentiate between constructive studies and overprotectiveness. Thus, too many make decisions for the officer and stifle his initiative. Commanders tolerate serious mistakes while severely reprimanding officers for small mistakes. There are numerous cases where punishments are improperly meted out.

VOLUME 9

1. Otchetam i Vyboram Partiinykh Organov - Vysokuiu Organizovannost'." (Reporting and Elections by Party Organization - A High Degree of Organization), pp 6-9.

This lead article evaluates the work of party reporting and election meetings at all levels of military units. These meetings determine the path to be taken in the next year to increase military preparedness and political education, hear reports from all involved parties, and elect new officials. They consider all facets of military preparedness, including socialist competition. The article allows that some improvements are needed. One must re-evaluate even the highest evaluations. In some units there exist low quality studies, ineffective use of time, and shallow training of personnel on weapons and other mechanical areas. All plans and programs are not fully implemented, and evaluations are not always based upon high standards. In one subunit, training of tankers and other specialized training was weak. Some party organizations allow mistakes and tolerate oversimplification and indulgence in training. Many evaluation documents and reports portray figures demonstrating fulfillment of obligations without specifics. One report described deficiencies without mentioning people responsible for this or the reasons for the deficiencies. In addition, it did not give praise when praise was due. Last year attention was paid to checking on the timely fulfillment of party decisions. Many times party organs discuss the strengthening of military order and observance of regulations.

But good intentions remain only good intentions. All too often, party workers appeared at meetings critical of situations which they should have foreseen.

2. General of the Army P. Lashchenko. "Formirovanie Voinskogo Kollektiva" (The Formation of a Military Collective), pp 9-13.

While talking about the role of the military collective as the basic cell in building Communism in the army, General Lashchenko surfaces some difficulties in the operations of the collective. He says that the military collective is the vanguard in the struggle for effectiveness and healthy morale in the army. The collective is led by the commander and political officer. While most work effective, some differences exist. In one unit second year soldiers were arrogant toward young new soldiers. The commander and political officers neglected the situation and a senior officer had to intervene. The chief fault in the leadership of commanders in the collective is that often their actions are not preventative. Rather they act only as immediate response to already existing evils. Such officers do not use all the preventative means at their disposal such as assistance from experienced senior officers and World War II veterans.

3. Lieutenant General D. Shkrudnev. "Effektivnost' Kontrolia" (Effectiveness of Control), pp 53-55.

Lieutenant General Shkrudnev addresses the question of how to improve training and properly evaluate the success of that training. He cites several examples of low quality training in Trans-Baikal Military District to illustrate the need for closer checking and control. In several units, infantry driver training took place in oversimplified conditions without proper use of material aids. Thus drivers did not acquire needed habits. In some infantry and artillery battalions commander training was irregular. As a result, officers acted with uncertainty on tactical exercises, made decisions without sufficient analyses of conditions, and carried out those decisions lethargically. Thus some recently appointed company and battery commanders achieved mediocre results in firing and technical training. One of the chief reasons for this is weak control over military and political training. Some commanders recognize the need for constant and severe checking but in practice do otherwise. They limit themselves to giving such help to subordinates and instructions beginning with "You must.....you ought to...." Such help is of little value. Some officers conduct "naked inspections", devoid of content. They conduct inspections, make formal reports

of observed faults and do nothing further.

4. Colonel S. Bulyskin. "Uchenie po Upravleniiu Ognem" (Exercise in Controlling Fire). pp 83-89.

Colonel Bulyskin, while evaluating the conduct of one fire control exercise of an antiaircraft unit, concludes that the exercise was oversimplified and thus harmful to the good training of antiaircraft crews. The firing exercise was combined with practice flights of a neighboring aviation unit. Targets were introduced systematically, at wide time intervals and at a height where they were easy to engage. Enemy opposition was unskillful and no real obstacle. The commander was not confronted with disruption of his radio operations or his communication with battalion. Changes in ground conditions were made only on the map. Such conditions inflict great harm on antiaircraft training. Antiaircraft units should conduct fire under realistic and complicated battle conditions.

VOLUME 10

1. "Sovershenstvovat' Nochnuiu Podgotovku" (To Perfect Night Training), pp 2-5.

This lead article discusses the advantages and difficulties of night military operations. Considerable training is required to overcome such difficulties. While assessing the current state of night training the editors note some deficiencies. Some commanders prepare for night operations, organize for combat, clear lanes through minefields, improve their positions, conduct reconnaissance, and then fail to advance. They plan the attack before dawn but poorly organize light security, and exhibit extreme unwillingness to maneuver. Organization and control of mutual action (support) is very weak. Some specialized subunits still do not know how to lay and clear mines, lay lines of communication, create cross country tracks and use navigational aids. While organizing night battles, senior commanders often give subordinates insufficient time for work on the terrain. They also fail to use dummies of the terrain to practice organization for battle. Often plans are based on daytime requirements without consideration of specifics of night operation and competition is absent. All of this negatively affects night operations and deprives commanders of the possibility of determining the true level of preparedness of his unit.

2. Colonel I. Rogatin. "Vazhneishee Sredstvo Vospitania Ofitserov" (A Most Important Means of Educating Officers), pp 9-11.

Colonel Rogatin consider the question of mission fulfillment of commanders. He states that not only must orders be clear and well thought-out, they should also be carried out. Several examples are given to show that some commanders do not properly supervise their subordinates and see to it that their orders are carried out. This formalism by commanders, such that some orders remain orders on paper only, usually results from ignorance or lack of experience. Thus senior officers should hold meetings with subordinate commanders to enlighten them on proper procedure for controlling their subunits. Proper control also will prevent subordinate units from hiding realities from inspectors by the use of staged shows. One unit expecting a good rating on an inspection received a low evaluation because of low quality and oversimplified training. It turned out that senior staff officers checking the unit consulted with the commander, but failed to inspect the unit daily. In essence they failed to help the young commander correct defects in his unit. Such basic complacency and nonobjectivity by the staff reflected lack of concern within party organizations at headquarters. Party organizations did not evaluate activities of each Communist Party member and reconciled themselves to blaming subordinates and being silent about their own deficiencies.

3. Lieutenant General M. Ribikov. "Komplekcirovaniye na Takticheskikh Zaniatiyakh i Ucheniyakh" (Integration in Tactical Studies and Exercises), pp 28-31.

Lieutenant General Ribikov, Assistant Commander of Forces of Belorussian Military District for Military Training, stresses the role of integration in the attainment of effective military training. Integration means the combining of all types of forces on tactical operations and the conduct of all training in a tactical environment. An analysis of such integration in the Belorussian Military District indicates some problem areas exist. On one exercise, a tank unit was improperly camouflaged and failed to prepare its equipment for battle. Tracked vehicle treads and firing and observation equipment were improperly adjusted. All such work was put off until the unit arrived in the special preparation area. Many tank crews on the exercise simply traced the contours of their tank on the ground to a depth of one or two bayonets rather than dig a proper shelter. Regardless of where exercises are held, one must prepare tactical positions. "Then, by sweat and calloused hands you obtain exact knowledge of the demand in man hours for preparing simple shelters."

4. Lieutenant Colonel B. Gadalin. "Na Takoi li Effekt Razschityval Komandir" (What Effect did the Commander Count On), pp 39-43.

Lieutenant Colonel Gadalin analysis the performance of a motorized rifle company on an exercise and notes numerous serious faults resulting from poor tactical and political training of officers and soldiers alike. The unit assembled on signal very hurriedly and some soldiers forgot to take their assigned equipment. Sergeants created additional turmoil by hurrying these soldiers. The assembly was on time but better training would have improved the situation. In the movement to new positions the tank platoon was absent from its assigned position in the column because at the last minute it was kept at its home base. This hurt the exercise by depriving the company of practice in combined operations. The company arrived at new positions, properly assessed the enemy situation and organized security. However, while inspecting, the battalion commanders found that the chemical observation post was inexactly located and squads did not satisfy their norms. Platoon leaders were so concerned about equipment that they oversimplified training conditions. Competition was neglected, officers were careless, and Komsomol members played no role in the exercise. The company, reinforced by a mortar battery, was ordered to act as point unit of the battalion. The order of the battalion commander left too little time for proper organization of the march. Later the company commander received time extension but the battalion commander failed to check on the company commander's action on the march. This led to serious mistakes. The company commander's orders were confused and wordy, thus causing confusion among subordinates. The ensuing clarifications invested more time, and the commander had to hurry his orders for engaging the retreating enemy. These orders were too general. As a result, actions of subordinate units were disjointed and indecisive. During the attack, the company was subjected to air attack, obstacles and burning woods. The company commander did increase column speed and vehicle intervals yet the column did not engage in antiaircraft fire. Not one platoon or squad leader gave such an order. The advanced guard was poorly organized and deployed hastily on the basis of unclear orders. Consequently, one platoon deployed in the wrong direction without its assistant commander. The battalion commander had to halt the exercise to criticize and reorient the unit. A meeting battle began but the company commander failed to defeat the deployed enemy advance guard because he conducted a frontal assault and did not utilize maneuvers. Mortar support was ineffective because the mortar battery received its orders too late. During the attack one platoon deviated from the assigned direction. The entire company failed to deploy in line

and virtually attacked in column. This indicated poor mastery of coordinated action and mutual support. In general the exercise lacked realistic enemy fire. That explains in part the untimely speed and action of the APCs and the absence of camouflage. Radio deception measures were neglected, and positions for BMDs and foxholes were not prepared. The battalion and company commanders neglectfully and indulgently allowed such mistakes. The battalion commander did not utilize the educational value of the company commanders' mistakes. On occasions he simply prompted him on what to do, thus hindering the professional development of the company commander.

5. Colonel P. Simchenkov. "Plus Usiliia Shtaba" (Plus the Efforts of a Staff), pp 43-47.

Colonel Simchenkov writes in response to an earlier article by Colonel General Grinkevich concerning the necessity of well organized and controlled force. He seconds the opinion of General Grinkevich and points out that there are problems in the control of forces in battle. He cites the case of one commander on an exercise who ignored his staff and assistants and insisted on doing the work himself. During a night march, his unit was attacked by the enemy and suffered heavy losses. Only after considerable time and the intervention of a superior, did the commander use his staff and notice how effective it could be. The ensuing loss of time gave the enemy the initiative. The same commander also failed to insure that the mission was fulfilled by subordinates. Consequently the artillery lagged behind and engineer sapper support was late. Only the working map of the commander was worthy of compliments, having been continually updated by staff officers and chiefs of services. There are commanders, especially young ones, who superficially establish reconnaissance missions or entrust such missions to less responsible figures. They concentrate their attention on trivial questions, neglecting the really important question about the enemy.

6. Major General A. Zyrianov. "Znat' i Vypolniat' Ustavy" (To Know and Fulfill Regulations), pp 55-58.

Major General Zyrianov evaluates the enforcement of army regulations and notes that some problems exist. Some officers do not fulfill their responsibilities. They overlook violations of regulations in daily life such as morning inspections and physical training. These are considered as trifles by some staff officers. This serious neglect can lead to more serious violations. Many omissions are tolerated in the teaching and study of regulations. Such study is often incomplete and some units plan on in sufficient number of classes for sergeants and soldiers utilizing inadequate separate readings. This provides the troops

with only a partial understanding of regulations. One unit is cited as being lax in training, in unit security and maintenance of equipment. The officers have poor knowledge of regulations and only partially observe them. Such neglect of regulations in other units results in harm to the everyday life of soldiers, to his well-being, his free time, and his general level of training.

7. Lieutenant V. Iasenkov. "Boevye Pomoshchniki Ofitserov" (The Military Assistants of Officers), pp 58-61.

Lieutenant Iasenkov describes sergeants as the all important assistants to officers in all military matters. He notes that some sergeants are poorly trained to fulfill that role. While analyzing the sergeants of the unit, he observes that too often training of sergeants is conducted irregularly and on a low methodical level. While commanders do not belittle the importance of sergeants their training is often not purposeful enough. The price paid for this neglect is high. Exercises held during the past year showed sergeants to be hesitant in command, thus damaging the harmonious interaction of the platoons and the company. Socialist competition and military training were also harmed, and serious blunders were tolerated.

VOLUME 11

1. "Sovershchenstvovat' Metodicheskuiu Podgotovku Ofitserov" (To Improve the Methodical Training of Officers), pp 2-6.

In the lead article, the editors appeal to officers to improve professional performance in fulfilling the missions delineated by the Twenty-fifth Party Congress for the upcoming year. They reflect on some of the deficiencies and unsolved questions in the training of officers which hinder progress. In places, high quality studies are not achieved. They are conducted on a low level without rational use of study time and study materials. Some officers, especially graduates of military schools, do not achieve increased effectiveness and an understanding of socialist competition. An analysis of last year's successes and failures suggests some factors which effect these results. Methodical training of officers is limited in scope and poorly supported by educational materials. Military pedagogy and psychology is not taught according to plan and is ineffective because its value is underestimated. Some study neglects the time factor and is poorly planned. The waste of time hinders the achievement of tangible results. Instead of

engaging in practical work on problems designed to utilize competition in the achieving of norms, soldiers and sergeants listen to extended explanations of commanders. Commanders say "Do as I do" thus stifling and delaying the education of the soldiers. Too often the good methods and experiences of one unit are not transferred and utilized in other units. Thus are lost excellent occasions for improving the methodical mastery of training. Though senior officers usually approve plans of subordinates they often do so formally without a real check on the quality of the plans. The blame for low quality methods of training must be shared by senior officers who neglectfully approve poor plans.

2. Colonel E. Pal'tsev. "Povyshat' Rol' Pervichnykh Partinykh Organizatsii" (To Increase the Role of Primary Party Organizations), pp 7-10.

Colonel Pal'tsev discusses the importance of the role of political workers and party organization in increasing the military preparedness and political awareness of soldiers. By looking at such political work in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, he notes some deficiencies in that work. Some party organizations are weak, lacking in initiative and tolerant of mistakes. One subunit did not conduct a meaningful discussion of training procedures in eight months. There was no check on the work of officers who trained sergeants. Reports of communists were not acted upon and personal examples were not used in studies. Serious improvement is required in many headquarters and administrative party organs. They investigate problems of command training, staff efficiency and execution too timidly. They neglect an increase in quality, objectivity and creditability of established reports and other documents. Such reports are often wordy and voluminous, and make the situation look better than it actually is. One of the causes of those faults is an underestimation by the party of the value of self-criticism. Criticism is often neglected and, even if rendered, the names of the guilty are omitted. This in itself is a compromising attitude by party organizations.

3. Major General I. Skorodumov. "I Uchat' i Analizirovat'." (Both Study and Analyze), pp 22-23.

Major General Skorodumov evaluates the use of tactical statistics and objective evaluations in the analysis of the results of exercises. He notes that very often such statistics are not used and this in turn damages the effectiveness of the evaluation. He uses the results of one exercise to illustrate his point. The commander was unable to determine the speed of movement of his subunit, the width of the front of companies and battalions on the

offense, and the width and depth of such units in the defense. He had only approximate data. It turned out that advanced planning did not foresee the need of such data and the senior commander did not suggest obtaining such data when he approved the plan. In short, there was little statistical data available to evaluate the exercise. Some units also concentrate their attention on only one type of military action (Either offensive problems of defensive problems). They tend to neglect such topics as march training, movement by railroad, or forcing water barriers. Some units are consistantly used in the second echelon or reserve. These faults often result from a lack of analytical information on the part of the senior commander concerning earlier exercises, and a lack of knowledge of what unit failed what role in each exercise. Ignoring objective statistics, information and analysis hinder the introduction of advanced experience and more valid military training.

4. Lieutenant Colonel G. Loktev. "Metod Zaniatiia - Taktico-Stroevoi" (Method of Study - Tactical - Combatant), pp 24-29.

Lieutenant Colonel Loktev stresses the importance of tactical-combattatn study and good methodology in the conduct of that study. He points out some deficiencies in tactical training. Some officers do not realize the importance of such studies and tolerate serious mistakes. They give unclear missions, poorly utilize the defensive features of terrain, poorly coordinate fire support, work out problems in toto without considering each element of the problem, and fail to encourage soldiers to fulfill norms of performance. Thus the very form of study is distorted. Several such faults appeared in an exercise involving a motorized rifle company in the attack. Though all went well in general, the first platoon maintained improper intervals during deployment. Some soldiers picked poor firing position, and neglected the use of terrain and cover. Machine-gunners and grenade launchers especially "sinned" by carelessly controlling their fires. Distances to targets were incorrectly estimated and targets were engaged with improper weapons. The third platoon did not utilize terrain, deployed haphazardly and advanced sluggishly. Later in the operation the unit deployed to destroy an ambush. One platoon was supposed to engage the ambush force while the other two bypassed it. The platoon which was supposed to engage it delayed its action and then conducted a frontal assault, totally ignoring maneuver, across an open area. This would have been costly in real battle. The exercise commander then acted hastily and halted the entire operation because of the mistakes of one platoon. He required all

platoons to conduct the attack again when he should have allowed the remaining platoons to finish their mission unimpeded.

5. Colonel N. Trokhachev. "Politicheskim Zaniatiim - Neoslabnoe Vnimanie" (Unremitting Attention to Political Studies), pp 41-48.

Colonel Trokhachev explains the program underway in the Belorussian Military District to improve the quality of political training and ideological work. He focuses on the planning of such studies and the training of political personnel and notes some deficiencies. Some study groups are well planned but attendance turns out to be too low. This is caused by the inattentiveness of senior commanders. Other well planned work with people remains a paper creation which is not energetically carried into fruition. One unit simply did not organize instructional reports or lessons. The low quality political education in that unit caused serious conversations with the unit, political department and in a gathering of the chiefs of political organs.

Some units of the districts conduct training on the basis of simple questions and recommended readings, and literature. This lowers the overall quality and effectiveness of study. At times the leaders of seminars give the propagandists prepared lectures. These are dry and uninteresting and are usually read in a monotone with little fervor. They have little appeal and are of no benefit. Propagandists must be original and independent in their work. Other units so poorly organize their work day as to exhibit the work of the propagandist. In some units the organizer of political lectures is absent from such political meetings.

6. Colonel P. Shchekochikhin. "Vospityvat' Kazhdogo" (To Educate Everyone), pp 55-58.

Colonel Shchekochikhin, while calling for the improvement of ideological and political work, emphasizes the importance of individual work with soldiers and notes some problems in that regard. He illustrates this problem by referring to some cases in the Leningrad Military District. In some units, officers, warrant officers and sergeants fulfill these duties formally, according to fixed patterns, and administratively, without personal effective appeals to the military obligation of each soldier. Often individual meetings with soldiers occur only on the occasion of the soldier's arrival in the unit. Concern about the discipline and fighting spirit of a soldier is displayed only when he is in the process of

mastering a speciality. Afterwards such interest declines. In one unit the commander's interest in his troops fell off in the second year of service. The result was an increase in violations of discipline and poor relations between first and second year soldiers. Commanders and political workers must continually analyze their actions and the results of their actions. They must recognize and not tolerate violations of discipline. Some officers, while conducting political work, show an insufficient knowledge of their subordinates and speak to them in high tones. They often utilize poorly thought out disciplinary action. Warrant officers and sergeants should play a great role in improving the individual work of soldiers. Too often they do not perform this function. They do not possess the required pedagogical knowledge or habits to work with troops and resort to coarse shouts and disrespect to subordinates.

VOLUME 12

1. "Peredovoi Opyt - V Praktiku Voisk" (Advanced Experience in the Practical Work of Forces), pp 10-13.

While evaluating gains made in training in the armed forces, the editors in this lead article stress the need for introducing advanced experience and use of resourcefulness and inventiveness in the training of troops. They find some deficiencies in that regard. Practice shows that rationalizers and inventors do not always receive necessary support. Their advice is slowly implemented and where it is successful, it is not popularized. Thus units requiring solutions to similar problems waste time by finding their own solutions. Competition among units is neglected, good troops are praised for nonmilitary achievements, and field exercises are conducted in "hothouse" conditions, allowing indulgence and oversimplicity. Firing and special training is conducted without regard to tactical conditions and thus units considered to be well trained receive low evaluations on tests. One can find two subunits operating in similar conditions who receive different evaluations over a long period. It means that some units do not want or are not able to adopt advanced experience. Commanders and staff should show concern for the condition. Attention to competition, to increased effectiveness of training and the introduction of advanced experience will help erase eyewash, inflation of evaluations, the hiding of inefficiencies, simplicity of training, competition on paper, and sensationalism.

2. Colonel General V. Iakyshin. "Vazhnyi Faktor Povysheniia Boevoi Gotovnosti (The Important Factor of Increasing Military Preparedness), pp 14-18.

Chief of the General Staff, 1st Assistant Commander Chief of Ground Forces Colonel General Iakyshin comments on an earlier article of Colonel General Grinchevich which evaluates the question of controlling forces under contemporary conditions. He concludes that one of the most important factors is the level of effectiveness, of control and communication systems, most importantly the effectiveness of the commander and his staff. While noting the conditions necessary to obtain full effectiveness he mentions some current problems. The actions of one commander show that time is often wasted. He spent one and one half hours formulating an advanced order after receipt of his mission. Compounding the error, the resulting order did not provide subordinates with the required information. On exercises receipt of information is often untimely and important documents are disseminated too late for optimum use. Staffs do not rapidly adjust to changing conditions and their inability to digest and analyze current information places commanders in difficult positions. Such cases bear witness to a low level of staff efficiency, weak coordination of staff work, and insufficient level of individual competency.

3. Major General N. Smorigo. "Marksistko-Leninskoi Uchebe Ofitserov-Vysokiyu Effektivnost'." (Marxist-Leninist Studies of Officers - High Effectiveness), pp 19-23.

Major General Smorigo, Assistant Chief of the Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation of the Chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Fleet, while considering the upcoming year's training, discusses the importance of basing training on sound Marxist-Leninist principles. He finds some faults in the Marxist-Leninist studies of officers. Commanders, party organs and political organs have found a number of unresolved questions. Some leaders fail to persistently struggle for effectiveness of theoretical studies for a high level of ideology and organization. Seminars often do not creatively treat the important questions posed to them. Formalism in the conduct of studies allows deep concrete thinking to be replaced by abstract thought and concern for external appearances. Often commanders ignore the conduct of such studies for long periods, in one case for a period of two months.

4. Colonel I. Kliachin. "Na Vernom Puti" (On the True Path), pp 55-57.

Colonel Kliachin harshly criticizes several subunits for their extremely poor performance during summer exercises in defending against weapons of massive destruction (ZOMP). He singles out three commanders and relates in detail the deficiencies found in their units. The commanders and their troops displayed a weak knowledge of the qualities of nuclear and chemical weapons and incendiary devices of the enemy and had difficulty defending against them. When attacked the unit was unsure of itself, slow and unskillfull. The commander failed to delineate responsibilities for defense, for chemical and radiological reconnaissance, for engineer support, for informing troops about contamination and for the alleviation of the ill effects of chemical and nuclear attack. These neglects were caused by a low methodical level of training in the unit. Norms for defense and decontamination were oversimplified and excessively tolerant. Enemy actions on exercises were unrealistic and students were allowed mistakes which lowered the evaluation of the unit. Commanders of platoons and companies were not familiar with conditions for fulfilling the norms and thus could not objectively evaluate them. Methodical training in ZOMP was rarely conducted.

Though one of the chief means of defense is radiological and chemical reconnaissance many squads and crews assigned that mission were not properly prepared. Soldiers seldom knew the signs of the use of such weapons and could not operate their regular equipment. Subunit commanders seldom gave missions for chemical and nuclear reconnaissance and poorly supervised their fulfillment. As a result, they were simply not aware of the situation. One chief cause of the problem is that in field exercises, conditions are simplified and missions are completed in an overly tolerant atmosphere. If ZOMP measures are included, they are incomplete. Soldiers are deprived of the chance of working individually or in a group under nuclear or chemical conditions. Efforts to correct this problem were partially successful. In many units norms of defense were given only "satisfactory" ratings. Many mistakes were tolerated in night operations and operations in complex conditions. Tank and vehicle operators had difficulty decontaminating vehicles. Individual use of medicine to ward off initial effects of radiation was poor. Units also had difficulty operating for long periods in contaminated areas. There was little coordination between responsible figures, concerning timely assessment of levels of contamination received by individual soldiers. The chief of the chemical service unit at one stage could not clearly organize chemical -

radiological reconnaissance and gather information about the contaminated area. As a result, several units received high levels of radiation. All these factors caused the unit to receive a low evaluation on the controlled exercise.

TYL i SNABZHENIE

VOLUME 1

1. Colonel General I. Golushko and Colonel I. Kushch.
"Voenno-Nauchnaia Rabota: Edinstvo Teorii i Praktiki"
(Military Scientific Work: Unity of Theory and Practice),
pp 26-31.

The authors discuss the need for accelerating scientific technical progress in the army, in particular in regard to creation of a scientific basis for the operation of rear service units and the logistical system. Emphasis is placed on the utilization of computers and advanced mathematical techniques, the insurance that rear unit survive in wartime, and modern education of rear service troops. Planning of military scientific work is of central importance. In practice there are deficiencies in that planning. Too often qualified general officers are not used in the situation of complex problems. Contemporary advanced economic - mathematical methods of analysis are not always used in solution of knotty problems. While military academic institutions occupy a central position in the development of theory, they still suffer from isolation from real requirements of armed forces and fleet and from a lack of specificity of their conclusions and recommendations. Materials for publications and dissertations should relate to specific demands of the military, to specific programs. They presently do not. They do not provide the army and fleet with scientifically conditional methods of group exercise or individual unit or personnel training. Often such institutions think that teaching is the most important function and scientific work is simply an additional burden. But the two fields cannot be separated.

2. Colonel K. Polukhin. "Vyshe Trebovatel'nost - Krepche Distsiplina" (Higher Exactingness - Stronger Discipline),
pp 32-36.

Colonel Polukhin discusses the system of training used at Bogdan Khmel'nitskii Military School at Ulianovsk. While evaluating a party conference at the school, he notes some

deficiencies in the realm of military discipline and the work of communists. Most communists strive for increased discipline, however, there are those who fail to actually stimulate a feeling of responsibility among soldiers. Several officers allowed students with low moral qualities to enroll at the school. Other officers did not display high ideas or exactness in front of students. Training in some areas is poorly organized. When one major tolerated unworthy conduct of a student, his compatriots let it pass. Such toleration, liberalism and leniency to violators never lead to good results.

3. Lieutenant General I. Isaenko. "Sovershenstvovat' Organizatsii Prodovol'stvennogo Obespecheniia Voisk" (Perfecting the Organization of the Ration Provisioning of Troops), pp 51-56.

Lieutenant General Isaenko, Chief of Central Food Administration, Ministry of Defense, talks about food supply and rations in the army and navy and notes the rising complexity of the problem. He claims that although the quantity and quality of rations have improved and the organized system of supply has improved, there are still some deficiencies. Some food specialists are careless and indifferent in maintaining a sufficient variety of food. Commanders often do not know the norm of rations for soldiers and do not fully control the distribution of prescribed amounts. One officer daily gave out insufficient amounts of rice and macaroni and replaced them with other foods. This seriously depleted stocks of preserved and concentrated foods which are needed by field units when fresh food is not available or time is limited for its preparation. Although fresh water fish made up eighty percent of all fish supplied to troops, in some units they are distributed in insufficient quantities due to lack of storage means. Storage problems are also evident in the case of potatoes. Good potatoes are often stored, and rot after only one month due to improper storage and inattention to temperature and humidity requirements. Then troops must eat groats which are of lower food value than potatoes. Food supply officers are slow to adopt the progressive use of containers for storage. Many military districts wait for initiative from above rather than undertaking local programs to prepare storage containers. Many storage facilities and warehouses are built on the basis of old plans and neglect modern features. Dining halls are also built without modern features and refrigeration equipment. Food preparation methods and serving lines are crude. Kitchens are dark and black and often utilize coal and wood

as fuel. Careful attention is not paid to modern construction techniques. Dishwashing techniques are antiquated, and dining halls are built with door passages too small to allow passage of serving carts from kitchen to dining rooms. Expensive equipment often functions badly because irresponsible and untrained people are assigned to operate it, and repair groups are not created to maintain it. Modern plastic dinnerware is used carelessly causing much waste and loss. In general creative action and initiative is required to correct such problems.

VOLUME 2

1. Major General L. Sorochenko. "S Uchetom Vozroshikh Trebovaniy" (With Regards to Growing Demands), pp 24-28.

Major General Sorochenko, Assistant Commander of Rear Forces of Trans Caucasian Military District, investigates the conduct of officers, praporshiki and NCO's of the rear services, and notes some deficiencies. Though officers must be professionally qualified, experienced and cognizant of their responsibilities, some work intensively but ineffectively. Training programs are weak and independent study is underestimated. One chief of food service immersed himself in so many complicated matters that he was unable to successfully complete any of them. Even experienced officers lose the thread of planning and violate proven sequencing of action. Many cannot adapt to changing conditions. One officer began construction before receipt of all materials, and consequently work goes on spasmodically. Often officers liberally squander promises. They take on any and all responsibilities and suffer from ensuing frustrations. One officer agreed to all advices, translations and orders without question, then promptly forgot about them. Because of his miscalculation several subunits were unprepared for winter exercises. Some officers embellish the actual state of affairs. The desired result passes for the actual result. Several officers of one unit gave fake reports on the state of affairs in their unit. An inspection showed that living arrangements in the unit were antiquated and hurriedly created. Units engage in unsystematic, aimless work causing confusion and deficiencies. Party workers and propagandists must help in organizing work and creating priorities so that runaway order does not discredit all constructive work.

2. Captain Kurin. "Liubit' Svoiu Professiiu" (To Love Ones Own Profession), pp 40-41.

Captain Kurin comments on an earlier article concerning the achievement of mastery in one's field. He agrees that hard work is the answer but says that all are not suited for immediate command of rear service units. As evidence he points out some deficiencies among officers of the rear services. Many still think that anyone can command a rear service unit. Therefore, officers from front line units are given command in the rear without consideration of their inclination and with the belief that all they need do is study administrative documents. Reality proves otherwise. One officer accepted transfer from a line unit to rear service command, thinking that his new work would be easy. In reality he could not cope with the numerous administrative requirements and supply duties. One must master everything and foresee all eventualities. Other examples exist where officers should not handle all the various duties and neglected both its supply of units and the maintenance of the welfare of the men.

VOLUME 3

1. Lieutenant General, M. Popkov. "Boegotovnost' Postoiannaia Bditel'nost' Vysokaia" (Constant Military Preparedness, High Vigilance), pp 16-21.

Lieutenant General Popkov, Chief of Political Administration, Central Asian Military District discusses measures undertaken in his military district to implement Twenty-fifth Party Congress decrees to improve preparedness and political education of rear service units. While he praises general accomplishments he notes some deficiencies. Some officers fail to struggle against used pattern simplification, vulgarization, indulgence in training, thus creating stagnation in their units. Units neglect field duty and conduct supply operations in nontactical conditions. Party - political work is often neglected. Neglect of improving material base of studies causes low quality tactical exercises and poor individual training. This condition in one unit led to disorganized refueling support of a tank unit which was corrected only by interference by the Chief of the exercise. Another unit displayed poor discipline and low level of political and specialized training. This was caused by unclear and inaccurate orders, bad internal order, violation of rules of

driving, irresponsibility of leaders and unskillfull organization of socialist competition. Some officers, carried away by the scale of their work, overlook individual work with soldiers and become out of touch with realities. One often meets commanders and political workers who talk in generalities about discipline and work with soldiers "on the whole" while neglecting individual work.

2. Major General F. Markovskii. "Vazhnaia Obiazannost' Komandira" (The Important Obligation of a Commander). pp 48-54.

Major General Markovskii discusses the practical work of a regimental commander with emphasis on the attention paid to rear service and support operation. He cites a number of instances where commanders display initiative and proper use of resources in solving problems. However, some failures are evident. On one exercise the young commander, carried away by battle, neglected rear services to the extent that it interfered with mission fulfillment. This appears to be a general tendency. Another rear service commander failed to give a clear order on when and where to deploy mess facilities to feed the troops. Thus when the tank unit moved forward, a mess unit commander became confused and fell behind. Only the intervention of a superior officer allowed feeding of troops (although late). Some commander ignore economy in their work. Control over resources is weak, as is supply support documentation, and waste results. Procedures used to control material variables, especially clothing and personnel equipment should be improved. Lack of control leads to unlawful use of such equipment. Young commanders do not utilize the experience of senior commanders and staff officers.

VOLUME 4

1. Major General A. Putoshkin. "Sorevnovanie - Neot'emlemaia Chast' Uchebnogo Protsessa". (Competition - An Inalienable Part of the Training Process), pp 31-34.

Major General Putoshkin, Assistant Commander for the Rear, Central Group of Forces, while stressing the importance of socialist competition in the building of initiative and creativity in work, notes evidence that there is a lack of competition in some rear service units. An inspection of one subunit showed a lack of spirit or enthusiasm. Soldiers acted limpid and sluggish because competition was not organized and soldiers did not know where they stood in their work. Such problems are usually created by the early formal approach of some commanders.

VOLUME 5

1. "Vdokhnovlenye Resheniami S'ezda" (Inspired by the Decisions of the Congress), pp 3-6.

This lead article discusses implementation in the army of directives of the Twenty-fifth Party Congress. While most units of rear service deploy effective training and high quality work and competition, some do not. Some commanders inadequately oversee the creation and completion of competition. Good programs are developed but not carried out.

2. Colonel General A. Gribkov. "Za Effectivnost Polevoi Vyuchki", (For the Effectiveness of Field Training), pp 19-23.

Colonel General Gribkov, Commander of Leningrad Military District, talks of measures undertaken to improve training of rear service units in the district. Some commanders in the district underestimate field training of rear service units and tend to underestimate the role of rear service units in contemporary battle.

3. Colonel V. Mironiuk. "V Bor'be za Distriplinu" (IN the Struggle for Discipline), pp 28-31.

Colonel Mironiuk, Chief of Political department of Staff and Command, Trans Caucasian Military District, emphasizes the importance of political education in all units. Because a lack of desire of officers of the rear to work with soldiers in political education has been noted, political education has been made a matter for inspection by higher headquarters. An investigation of one unit where disciplinary violations occurred showed that such crimes occurred because the commanders demanded little from subordinates and lacked ideological influence. Many soldiers who work without constant supervision (Code - shopkeepers, drivers) used various pretexts to avoid political meetings and studies. "They even violated dress regulations". "Characteristically" the commanders did nothing about it. Higher Staff officers sometimes neglect monitoring of political activities in subordinate units and thus have a false picture of reality in the unit. This can result in the unit receiving a higher rating than it should. Additionally, some commanders avoid political work by claiming they are overloaded with work and by using other "objective" reasons.

4. Lieutenant General M. Ponomarev. "Zabota o Byt'e Voinov". (Concern about the Way of Life of Soldiers), pp 41-45.

Lieutenant General Ponomarev analyzes attempts to improve the well being of each soldier. By evaluating the implementation of the new regulation (Ustava), the General finds that some officers show a lack of concern for their troops. In some units there is a problem in the apportionment of food. Apportionments are made formally and often are not checked. Some soldiers are shorted in the process. Regulations specify that commanders or assistant commanders make daily checks of food. This is often ignored. The failure of officers to insure that dishwashing regulations are followed leads to such undesirable consequences as food poisoning. Regulations providing for the heating of barracks are violated. Doors are not winterized, windows are not sealed or glazed. In one camp of Moscow Military District, temperatures were insufficient in every barracks. Regulations providing for personal hygiene of troops are also often ignored. Though showers are available in baking and cooking areas, they are often absent in motor pools and shops.

5. Major General N. Sokolov and Colonel I. Chupalenkov. "Sotsialisticheskaya Sobstvennost' Sviashchenna i Neprikosnovenna" (Socialist Property Sacred and Inviolable), pp 64-66.

Major General Sokolov and Colonel Chupalenkov, both legal officers, discuss the existing problem of negligence in the securing of valuable military materials and property. They note that judicial officers should play a role in the solution of such problems. Some responsible officers improperly control unit property and are careless in the maintenance of the living fund. Internal investigating commissions tolerate formalism in their work, creating conditions which can cause the loss of property. As an example the authors cite the operation of a food warehouse which perpetually had a surplus of flour. A check of the warehouse's procedures showed the surplus resulted from poor daily accounting of stocks. The internal investigating commission, in that instance, did not conduct a proper audit. Right of entrance to the warehouse was not controlled by a responsible figure and officers did not supervise the asset of warehouse clerks.

VOLUME 6

1. Colonel General P. Sysoev. "Nastoichivo Rastit' Klassesnykh Spetsialistov" (To Persistently Train Specialists of all Levels), pp 18-23.

Colonel General P. Sysoev, First Assistant Chief of Rear Services of the Soviet Armed Forces, writes in response to an earlier article entitled "To be a Master of ones Affairs." He investigates the training of various levels of specialists in the rear services and notes some formalism in that training. There have been frequent interruptions in training caused by insufficient planning and poor control over individual officer study. The careless formal approach of some officers hinders the training of well qualified specialists.

2. Lieutenant Colonel M. Evseenko. "Rabochaia Karta Zamestitelia Komandira Chasti po Tylu". (The Working Map of an Assistant Unit Commander for Rear Services), pp 34-37.

Lieutenant Colonel Evseenko emphasizes the necessity for every commander to know the conditions of battle so as to adjust to rapid changes. This especially applies to the Assistant Commander for the Rear, whose job is extremely complex. Of great importance is the commander's working map which deploys all requirements, boundaries and locations of units. Though it is a basic and elemental document which must be maintained and utilized, some officers neglect its use. One unit conducted a night march, deployed for battle and successfully penetrated the defense zone of the enemy. When a senior officer arrived at the unit commander's command post and asked the commander to report on conditions, the commander took from his map case a sloppy, unclear, and inaccurate map and began to report. Obviously the report failed. Almost nothing was registered on the map with the exception of general delineating lines and the unit mission. The commander did not even know the location of his subunits. In another case an officer's map was cluttered with unneeded information and thus unintelligible.

3. Colonel General D. Kubshinski. "Vazhnii Faktor Boevogotovnosti Voisk" (An Important Factor in the Combat Readiness of Troops), pp 45-51.

Colonel General Kubshinski of the Medical Services, discusses some faults noticed in the operation of medical services of the army. Though many clinics and medical officers utilize new techniques and methods, some do not show the required resourcefulness. Some medical institutions fail to use up to date techniques and machinery and carelessly fulfill their responsibilities. In addition, they display basic inattentiveness to patients. This is incompatible with good health care.

VOLUME 7

1. Major-General (Quartermaster) E. Gold'berg, "K Novym Rubezham." (To New Limits), pp 41-47.

Efforts to increase commodity turnover in military sales facilities would have been more successful if material losses, which exceeded the expected level, would have been prevented. Although the number of trained, qualified managerial personnel increased during the preceding five-year plan, poor planning, lack of administrative ability and improper use of equipment contributed to the excessive material losses. Failure to maintain contact with suppliers resulted in the receipt of unmarketable goods which had to be written off. Additional losses were incurred during shipment, due to improper packaging, and by misshipment of orders.

2. Brigadier General A. Sitnikov. "Kazhdomu Spetsialistu Tyla - Glubokie Ekonomicheskie Znaniia." (Every Rear Services Specialist Must Possess a Thorough Knowledge of Economics), pp 63-66.

The Deputy for Rear Services of the Northern Caucasus Military District states that not all rear service officers have been properly trained nor possess the necessary experience to do their jobs well. Therefore, training of these officers must be continued within their unit of assignment. He criticizes some of the district's military installations for failure to conduct programs to impress upon the individual soldier the importance of supply economy. Individual regiments are criticized for poor supply planning and for not correcting errors in their plans, and for the inactivity of their "economic committees."

3. Colonel V. Abramov. "V Poru Voiskovykh Uchenii." (At the Right Time of Military Training), pp 73-76.

While discussing the opportunities that summer troop movements present to military transport units for improving their skills in the planning and execution of such movements, the author points out that individual transportation officers do not possess sufficient knowledge of com-

bat vehicles and equipment, nor of the procedures for arranging such equipment on railroad cars. Knowledge of loading procedures of some officers is so weak that they lose control of this operation. Such problems are compounded by commanders who disregard loading plans when they discover that their equipment is going onto flatcars, believing that a loading plan is not necessary for such cars. Other commanders attempt to coordinate movements with the local railroad offices, rather than with the movement commander.

The author also states, without further discussion, that during troop movements there are deficiencies in engineer support, in the organization of security, air defense, and defense against nuclear attacks.

4. Major General N. Goncharov. "Partiinaia Zabota o Byte Voinov". (Party Concern About the Way of Life of Soldiers), pp 52-56.

Major General Goncharov discusses the constant concern of the Communist Party for the well being of the individual soldiers, in particular for medical material and food support. He notes that some units do not pay proper attention to the sustenance of troops. Some commanders and political workers show a lack of concern over the preparing and serving of food to the troops. They also fail to choose the best candidates for cook's school. Some units improperly store food products. The soldiers of one unit complained about the quality and quantity of food. An inspection revealed that soldiers were served an unsufficient amount of such basic food as meal, sugar, butter and meat. A check of food storage areas showed a surplus of canned meats, meal, dried fruits, sugar and groats. This indicates serious neglect on the part of the unit commander.

5. Colonel V. Metlov. "Luchshe Udovletvoriat' Spros Pokupatelei" (To Better Satisfy the Demands of Customers), pp 57-58.

Colonel Metlov, while discussing the adequacy of supplying soldiers' military and personal needs, notes some problems in the system of supply. These problems are mentioned in a speech by General E. Goldberg, Chief of Main Directorate for Trade of the Ministry of Defense, delivered to his subordinate commanders. In his speech the General says that current levels of supply do not satisfy the troops' demands. The network of military businesses is insufficiently developed, especially in separate garrisons. There have been stoppages in the supply of items of the highest necessity. Some workers in these businesses have been inattentive to the needs and desires of customers.

VOLUME 8

1. Lead Article "Svoevremmenno Podgotovit'cia k Zime" (To Prepare in Time for Winter), pp 3-5.

The journal provides a reminder that all repair or renovation projects should be nearing completion as winter approaches. The experience of last winter included installations which had not repaired heating systems, or component parts, and therefore, suffered due to insufficient vegetables, or let them rot in storage. It has been noted that as this winter approaches, on several installations, major or routine repair projects which were started late are progressing slowly or have already been postponed until a later date. Such facts indicate that problems will arise again this winter. Such deficiencies are the result of poor planning and weak command and Party control.

2. Lieutenant General (Aviation) V. Loginov. "Umelo Obespechivat' Polety Aviatsii." (To Skillfully Support Flights of Aircraft), pp 17-21.

The Soviet Air Force is provided with first-class aircraft. However, the Chief of Air Force Rear Services expresses his concern that the maintenance support in some units is of questionable quality. This is due to low quality training of rear service specialists. In some locations, the training of these personnel has been placed in the hands of insufficiently prepared instructors, who frequently disrupt training by assigning students to routine garrison details. In a number of units, the training base cannot meet the demands of highly qualified specialists.

While discussing rear service personnel as a group, the author notes that incidents of violation of discipline still occur and there are occasions when rules of flight safety are not observed.

3. Colonel V. Efremov. "S Uchetom Postavlennyykh Zadach." (With Regard for Assigned Missions), pp 27-29.

The author, an inspector for the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, states that the organization of socialist competition in the accomplishing of particular tasks is one of the weakest parts of

political-educational work. Individual soldiers or entire units frequently approach specific training missions with an attitude of formalism. They establish standards or goals which they do not intend to achieve. The efforts of Party and Komsomol organizations are insufficient to affect improvement of the situation. He also points out that in a number of units, battalion size and smaller, insufficient attention is given to the relationship of moral-political training, and combat in a nuclear situation.

4. Brigadier General V. Zaitsev. "Na Uroven' Sovremennikh Trebovanii", (To the Level of Present-Day Demands), pp 30-35.

As a means for improving the instruction of teachers and raising the level of competence of future rear service officers, both teachers and students spend a period of time in practical training in rear service or line units. This time provides teachers the opportunity to see how well their instruction prepares students for future jobs, and to make adjustments if necessary. It provides students the opportunity to develop practical skills in applying theoretical knowledge. This program requires extensive planning and assistance from the units in which the teachers and students work. The program apparently operates smoothly for teachers, but problems have been identified with the student training period. The author notes that some receiving units do not understand the purpose of the program, use the students for other duties, do not monitor their work, and are not objective in evaluating the work of the students.

5. Major General M. Manakin. "Peredovoi Opyt Vedeniia Voiskovogo Khoziaistva v Praktiku" (To put into Practice the Leading Experience of the Conduct of Military Management), pp 51-54.

In this article Deputy for Rear Services of the Moscow Military District discusses the rear service programs in the district. He emphasizes supply management and the exploitation in training programs of the knowledge possessed by experienced rear service specialists. Although significant success has been achieved, the author notes that deficiencies in these areas still exist in some of the district's units. Management records, such as personal clothing records, property books and medical inventories, are not properly maintained. Supply items are improperly stored and in some areas are in need of maintenance.

Poor selection, training and assignment of rear service personnel, lack of continued training of these specialists, and a lack of effective command and control are given as the reasons for the existence of such deficiencies.

6. Major O. Ozerov. "Voennuiu Formu Nado Uvazhat'." (One Should Respect the Military Uniform), p 90.

The author, a member of the Military Commander's Office at a railroad station, states that transient enlisted men and sergeants have to be detained due to their unauthorized alteration of rank or branch insignia, or for wearing unauthorized, self-made badges. He further states that some of these personnel assert that their commanders have observed the appearance of their uniforms and said nothing. The author considers such breaches of regulation to be caused by a lack of discipline on the part of individual soldiers and inattention to duty on the part of their leaders.

VOLUME 9

1. Lead Article. "Molodym Ofiterskim Kadram - Zabotu, Vnimanie." (We Must Show Concern for and Give Attention to Young Officer Cadre), pp 3-6.

Graduates of the military educational institutions possess the theoretical knowledge, but lack the practical experience and skills needed to effectively carry out their duties. The journal emphasizes the importance of continued training of young officers, in their units, to more rapidly provide them practical skills and experience.

The journal points out that such training programs frequently are not based on an analysis of the needs or capabilities of young rear service officers. More effort is needed to identify the weaker officers so that individualized training can be given to them. Some senior rear service officers are not fulfilling their responsibility to develop young officers. They give little or no assistance, and in some instances impede development by taking disciplinary action against those who make mistakes due to their inexperience. The journal does note that some of the graduates of the educational institutions have low morals, are undisciplined and are unable to function without close supervision.

As an additional note, it is stated that in some units, the quarters provided to young officers are poorly equipped and maintained, and have no laundry facilities.

2. Colonel D. Dmitriev. "Do Soznaniia Kazhdovo." (To the Consciousness of Each). pp 14-16.

Great efforts have been initiated to carry out the decisions of the 25th Party Congress, and to meet the goals of the new five-year plan in which "effectiveness and quality" are being emphasized. The author notes that, unfortunately, the program has not reached the hearts of all workers in the garrison to which he is assigned. Some people are more interested in "ticking off" completion of various stages of plans than in insuring that goals are being met. In some units, plans have been made, but no steps have been taken to carry them out or measures have been implemented without adequate preparation. Party appeals to action at times reflect formalism and have little effect. The importance of deeds, rather than words, must be implemented in the consciousness of each worker, and must be stressed in ideological training.

3. Brigadier General V. Komissarov. "Shkola Vospitaniia." (School of Preparation), pp 22-28.

A basic requirement of the Party is that all military personnel be given a thorough political education during their period of service. Soviet youth, when they finish their active - duty service, will have completed the "school of political preparation." To meet this requirement, the Army has given its officers the additional duty of participating in the political training of all soldiers. The author, First Deputy to the Chief of the Political Directorate of the Moscow Military District, points out that some rear service officers in the district are neglecting this duty. These officers do not participate in ideological-political work, consider such work beyond the scope of their responsibilities, and lock themselves into the narrow world of their particular specialties. Party organizations must take note of these facts and insure that these officers become involved in the political training of their subordinates.

4. Brigadier General F. Petrov. "Nasushchnye Zadachi Veshchevoi Sluzhby." (Vital Tasks of the Clothing Service), pp 51-56.

In recent years, measures have been taken to improve the quality and type of uniforms, particularly those worn by enlisted personnel. Quartermaster service currently has sufficient stocks available for timely and complete outfitting of Army and Navy personnel. The problems noted by the Chief of Clothing Supply of the Ministry of Defense relate not to availability, but to the issuing and maintaining of uniforms and footwear.

General Petrov states that initial issue of uniforms is a frequently neglected operation. Items of clothing are issued late, even when adequate supplies are on hand in the unit. In many units the appearance of uniforms does not meet regulations because commanders fail to insure that required inspections are made and deficiencies corrected. Improper use of repair facilities precludes repair of clothing and footwear. Failure to dry-clean uniforms according to prescribed schedules shortens the effective useful life of the clothing.

The author also notes that mechanization of the handling of packaged clothing items has fallen behind schedule in some units. Additional emphasis on the training of specialists to handle the new equipment is necessary to solve the problem. An attempt to establish a statistical data base on the useful life of new products is incomplete due to failure of units using new equipment to complete quality-evaluation reports.

5. Major General A. Shedorov "Za Obraztsovoe Soderzhanie Kazarmenno - Zhilishchnovo Fonda." (For Model Maintenance of Barracks and Housing Resources). pp 57-62.

In a review of maintenance, operation and repair of barracks and housing resources, the head of the Directorate of Billeting Operations of the Ministry of Defense points out several deficiencies. In a number of installations maintenance is unsatisfactory and in several military districts funds and materials specifically allocated for repair work are being misused. Due to poor planning and superficial inspection and selection of buildings for major repair, buildings in urgent need of repair are not included in plans or monies and materials are so dispersed in numerous projects that the overall effort is unsuccessful. The maintenance of apartment houses has also been effected by excessive turnover of managers. In the area of new construction, excessive decorative work has been noted. Due to poor quality control, defects in construction are not identified for immediate correction to prevent additional expenditures in the future.

Efforts to automate various systems, such as water supply and external lighting, or to effect reductions in use or losses, is not being given sufficient attention in some districts and the program is behind schedule. Equipment provided for automation programs frequently sits in warehouses for extensive periods.

The author also notes that units are failing to provide quality evaluation reports on new equipment. This is affecting the establishment of a data base on the quality useable life of new equipment.

VOLUME 10

1. Lieutenant General V. Dutov. "Rezhim Ekonomii - Metod Khoziaistvovaniia". (Policy of Economy - Method of Management), pp 14-18.

The Soviet Government is providing more financing and material resources to the Armed Forces. To insure that maximum utilization of these resources is achieved, management policies have been developed and enacted. However, the Chief of the Central Financial Directorate of the Ministry of Defense complains that resources are not being used effectively.

He states that a lack of ability to plan and organize transportation of material and the low level of mechanization of loading-unloading of material cause excessive standing time by carriers and, therefore, fines and financial losses. In some firms producing items for the military, plans are not fulfilled, funds for wages are overdrawn, waste and loss of money occurs, and production funds and funds for bonuses are ineffectively used.

In a discussion about construction programs, the author notes, that due to poor management needed materials are dissipated by allocation to too many construction sites, while insufficient materials are allocated to projects which are just starting or which have been carried over. As a result construction time is increasing and the number of incomplete projects is growing. In some construction organizations, overexpenditures and losses of material have been detected, as well as instances of falsification and overstating of volume and cost of work.

The author states that as a general rule, losses occur due to a lack of control over all aspects of an operation and failure to select qualified personnel to fill management positions. Although much has been done to improve the effectiveness of the financial service, more improvement is still needed.

The author also notes that some military units are not using all available possibilities to provide themselves food by raising vegetables and livestock, or money by growing and selling various grain crops. Some of these units attempt to procure fodder through government channels. The author states that the basic sources for replenishment of unit operating funds is income from garden plots and from savings achieved in the operation of the unit.

- 2 Brigadier General A. Titov. "Vklad V Boegotovnost". (Their Contribution to Military Readiness), pp 23-26.

The Deputy for Rear Services in the Trans-Baikal Military District notes that a majority of the rear service units in the district have achieved a high state of combat preparedness. However, there are still units which are not prepared to function effectively in the field due to poor training or poor maintenance of equipment.

- 3 Commander V. Semid'ianov. "Kommandir Organizuet Sorevnovanie" (The Commander Organizes the Competition). pp 27-29

Socialist competition is designed to raise combat preparedness and to improve the education and political-moral qualities of military personnel. The commander is the main organizer of the competition, with the active support of Party workers and organizations. The author notes that within his unit, commanders of subunits are not fulfilling their responsibility in this matter. Poor training and maintenance, and the excessive time required to bring personnel and equipment to full combat status are the factors which make this neglect obvious. The author states that other deficiencies exist in his unit, but gives no details.

VOLUME 11

- 1 General S. Kurkotkin. "K Novym Rubezham v Ratnom Trude." (To New Limits in Military Work), pp 3-11.

In his article the Chief of Rear Services of the Soviet Armed Forces identifies his ideas of what should be emphasized in the new training year. The professional training of rear service officers needs greater attention both in the educational institutions and in the units, particularly in the areas of leadership, engineering, and methodology of teaching. In the past training year, due to poor training, particularly in rear area defense and security, lack of support for training, and inability of officers to make timely estimates and decisions, several battalion size and smaller units did not improve their combat proficiency. A significant factor contributing to this deficiency was the low quality instruction of officer-trainers.

The author also notes that although economical management and utilization of material resources has been heavily stressed, bad management and neglect on the part of responsible officers is still encountered.

- 2 Major General M. Shapovalov. "Prizvanie Politrabotnika." (The Politicalworker's Profession), pp 20-24

The main task of political workers at the present time is to thoroughly and convincingly explain the meaning and significance of the decisions of the Twenty-Fifth Party Congress, so that the decisions can become actions. However, the Chief of the Directorate of Cadre, of the Main Political Directorate of the Army and Navy, notes two facts which affect the completion of this task. The first is that there are political workers in the rear service units who are indifferent about fulfilling their responsibilities and only superficially do their jobs. The second fact is that some commanders and heads of political organs give little attention to the further training and development of political officers. Some commanders will get rid of political officers who make mistakes rather than actively work with them on an individual basis to improve their knowledge and effectiveness.

In a discussion about the need to improve socialist competition, the author states that some commanders and political workers make allowances for deficiencies. They use eyewash and inflation of scores to artificially improve training results.

- 3 Brigadier General V. Samoilenko. "Sotsialisticheskomu Sorevnovaniyu - Vysokuyu Effektivnost'." (Giving Attention to Socialist Competition Produces High Effectiveness), pp 25-30

Experience shows that successful field training greatly depends on the organization, preparation and conduct of classes and training and, in the Ural Military District, the including of socialist competition as an integral part of the training-educational process. The Head of the District's Political Directorate states that in some of the district's units there is poor organization and conduct of socialist competition and ineffective and uneconomical use of equipment and weaponry. In his opinion it is apparent that some party organs fail to recognize or understand the problem and cannot affect changes to improve the quality of training of rear service specialists.

- 4 Brigadier General A. Eremchenko. "Ratsional'no Ispol'zovat' Uchebnoe Vremia." (To Rationally Utilize Training Time).

Although not identifying specific problems, the author expresses concern about formalism in training and the failure of some instructors to effectively use training time.

- 5 Brigadier General V. Shudra. "Nepremennoe Uslovie Boevoi Gotovnosti Tyla." (Indispensable Condition of Combat Preparedness of the Rear), pp 52-56

In this article the Chief of Rear Services of the Turkistan Military District discusses the importance of effective storage of the material means of combat support. Although storage is an item of primary interest to the Military Council of the district, and is the subject of conferences with commanders, political workers, and rear service officers and specialists, problems still exist in the management of storage facilities. In some facilities, inventory control has not been established as required, control of material is weak and inventories are done superficially. In the storage of fuel and lubricants improvement is needed in inventory control and in control of quality.

The deficiencies, and theft, damage, waste and losses of materials, exist because commanders have failed to insure that competent managerial personnel are selected. They have also failed to insure that correct control procedures are instituted.

- 6 K. Polukhin. "Khoziaistvovat' Rachitel'no, Ekonommo." (To Manage Thoroughly, Economically), pp 67-70.

In August 1976, the author, accompanied by two colonels assigned to the district, conducted a review of the conduct of military management of resources in several units of the Odessa Military District. The author is a correspondent of the journal and his article is an accounting of the results of the review. He writes of his "raid" into the district. This is Soviet journalist-ic jargon for a special assignment to investigate suspected wrongdoings. It appears that the author moved from excellent units to those of lesser qualities in which he discovered several areas in which deficiencies in management existed. These problem areas are: improper storage; poor maintenance; lack of repair (some local repair facilities were not operating); poor training of rear service specialists; and neglect of duties and lack of control on the part of commanders, political workers and rear service officers. In general, the author observed evidence of significant negligence in the conduct of military management in the district.

VOLUME 12

- 1 Lead Article. "Distsiplina - Osnova Uspekha"
(Discipline is the Basis of Success), pp 25-28

Military discipline is based on high political awareness, deep understanding of Party duty and complete loyalty to the Party and homeland. The efforts of every commander, political worker and Party and Komsomol organization must be directed towards developing such qualities in each soldier.

In this article, concern is expressed that achievement of this goal is being affected by the failure of some military and political leaders to give proper attention to discipline. Some commanders do not know their subordinates well enough to know their needs so that training programs can be tailored to insure that the necessary qualities are emphasized and instilled in their subordinates. Young noncommissioned officers, "Warrant Officers", and officers do not always possess the skills needed to aid the commander in this area. Some are too liberal and tolerate and conceal violations of discipline and immoral acts. It has been noted that some Party organizations do not follow up decisions with actions to assist the commander in educating the troops. These organizations also tolerate low levels of discipline. A factor contributing to disciplinary violations is the failure of commanders and Party workers to explain and emphasize new disciplinary regulations. This failure and the other deficiencies lead to the creation of an environment in which discipline is neglected. In such an environment, tasks and duties are not fulfilled, and training and unit preparedness suffers.

- 2 Major General S. Sylatskov. "V Usloviakh, Priblizhennykh k Boevym". (In Conditions Approximating Combat), pp 29-33.

To be able to effectively complete their missions in combat, rear service personnel must be competent in the organization and use of camouflage. However, during a training exercise in the Leningrad Military District, it was noted that some rear service officers failed to effectively camouflage facilities and equipment. Some rear service officers were slow in making estimates of the situation and drawing the necessary conclusions as to how their operations were being affected by rapidly changing situations. The author also pointed out that equipment for loading-unloading work was not being fully exploited.

- 3 Major General A. Solov'ev. "Narodnomu Kontroliu-Operativnost', Deistvennost'." (National Control Requires Effectiveness), pp 58-62

The National Control organization, to a certain extent, can be compared to the General Accounting Office in the United States. Its organs within the military are particularly interested in the areas of storage, maintenance and economic utilization of material resources. The author notes that due to inadequate training of personnel inspections are carelessly done. Inspections also appear to be done only to meet a requirement and are directed towards areas of secondary importance. Within the national control organs there is a lack of guidance and evidence of poor planning. Inspectors are going outside of specified areas in planned inspections and their reports contain only general conclusions, not supported by facts. Due to a lack of knowledge of their responsibilities or authority, inspectors sometimes avoid direct, hard questions. Some commanders do not understand the role of these inspections and do not assist the inspectors.

KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL

VOLUME 1

1. General Lieutenant V. Danilov. "V Sviazi s Massami - Sila Partiinovo Rukovodstva" (The Strength of Party Leadership Lays in Communication with the Masses), pp 27-35.

The author, a member of the Military Council and Chief of the Political Directorate of the Northern Group of Soviet Forces, points out that some commanders and political workers are only paying lip service to political work. Mediocre work, half-hearted efforts, paper milling, continuous participation in nonproductive meetings and loss of direct contact with the troops have been noted in the activities of Party organizations and leaders. The author attributes these deficiencies to poor control by leading political officers who have isolated themselves from the troops. The political directorate had to intervene to correct the situation.

VOLUME 2

- 1 Lead Article. "V Godu XXV Sezda KPSS - k Novym Ratnym Uspekham". (In the Year of the 25th Party Congress - To New Military Successes), pp 9-14.

In order to meet Party demands for increased effectiveness, the military forces strove to improve the quality

of training and the mastering of new equipment and weaponry. This was done to achieve a higher level of combat preparedness. Although significant success was achieved, the overall effort suffered due to formalism. Training at times lacked a well defined program of instruction and socialist competition was poorly organized.

2. General-Colonel P. Gorchakov. "V Avangarde Pre-dsezdovskogo Sorevnovaniia". (In the Vanguard of the Pre-Congress Competition), pp 32-39.

The introduction of advanced weaponry into the Rocket Forces requires that commanders pay particular attention to insuring that personnel are technically proficient in the operations of new weapons. In his article, the Chief of the Political Directorate (Strategic Rocket Forces) devotes special attention to socialist competition, the tool which commanders can use to develop proficiency. He notes that there still are commanders who cannot effectively organize the competition, particularly as it applies to the conduct of combat training and in the execution of assigned tasks. These commanders do not know how to succinctly formulate tasks. This weakens the effectiveness of socialist competition and frequently the results of competitions are inflated to show more positive indicators of proficiency and, therefore, preparedness.

- 3 Senior Lieutenant V. Kuz'menko. "Umet' Govorit' Pravdu v Glaza". (To have the Ability to Speak the Truth to to your Fellowman), pp 59-64

The author discusses the need for Komsomol members to frankly point out and criticize deficiencies of their colleagues or those existing within their organizations. Failure to speak out has allowed deficiencies to continue to exist. As examples, he cites the following:

- Members not speaking out against the election of unqualified individuals to responsible positions in the Komsomol organization.
- The concealing of misdeeds by friends and fellow Komsomol members, or failure to correct those who are violating rules of dress or conduct.
- Failure to effectively use criticism or self-criticism.

VOLUME 3

- 1 General of the Army I. Pavlovskii, "Umelo Obuchat' i Vospitavat' Voinov". (To Skillfully Train and Educate Combat Troops), pp 9-17,

The author, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense, identifies and discusses the basic principles of training and education. He states that in general the principles are observed, but facts prove that in some instances formalism, oversimplification, and a mechanical approach to the job are tolerated.

- 2 General Major V. Balakirev. "Partiinoi Rabote - Vysokuiu Effectivnost'." (We Must give High Effectiveness to Party Work), pp 18-26.

General Balakirev, Chief of the Directorate of Organizational - Party Work (the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy) begins his article by noting successful Party efforts, but concludes by identifying the following deficiencies in Party work.

- Some commanders, political workers and Party organizations do not actively work to meet Party goals.

- Insensitivity of individual Party organizations to the need to increase the military - technical proficiency of officers, particularly the young officers who still lack experience.

- Party organizations are tolerant of deficiencies and in some instances attempt to lessen the responsibility of individual communists.

- Indifference of individual leaders toward fulfilling their Party obligations.

- Insufficient Party effort to prevent the violating of disciplinary regulations.

- Political leaders fail to actively participate in organizational activities.

- Organizations getting carried away with meetings, discussions and planning instead of being actively involved in political work with the troops.

- In some meetings and conferences the level of criticism had been low and only directed toward subordinate organizations.

- A tendency to identify individuals by name when discussing successes, but much less so when discussing negligence in work.

- In some Party committees the situation had so deteriorated that secretaries were dismissed from office by a secret vote.

- 3 Colonels B. Sapunov and V. Remizov. "Vospitatel'naia Sila Sovetskovo Iskustva." (The Educational Force of Soviet Art), pp 59-66.

In discussing the increased role of Soviet art and literature in the developing of the philosophical outlook of Soviet man, the authors note that they cannot but be concerned by the definite decrease of interest in the various forms of Soviet art. Some young soldiers, military cadets and young officers are expressing more interest in the trite music, poetry and songs of the West. The danger in this is that such interests support the ideological enemies in the West who would like to foist on Soviet youth petty bourgeois tastes and ideals.

VOLUME 4

- 1 General of the Army P. Belik. "K Novym Vysotam Boevogo Masterstva." (To New Heights of Fighting Skill), pp 27-34.

In his article the author discusses training in general and notes that success has been achieved in improving the fighting skills of the armed forces. He cautions readers however, that such an achievement should not lead to a relaxation of effort but rather serve as a springboard for further development. He makes the point that in some places formalism still exists and that training evaluations are artificially inflated as individual communists strive to depict the desirable as the actual.

- 2 Colonel G. Serebriakov, "Teoreticheskaia Konferentsiia Offitserov." (Theoretical Conferences for Officers), pp 73-77

General Serebriakov is the head of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation and Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany. The purpose of the conferences is to raise the level of military and political (particularly the latter) knowledge of officers. The author points out that unfortunately, at times the organizers forget that individual study is the basic means for improving one's knowledge and that time must be budgeted to allow for such study. Failure to allow for individual preparation for conferences has resulted in formalism in the conduct of conferences which therefore, proved to be of little value to the officers involved.

VOLUME 5

- 1 General Lieutenant M. Popkov. "Osvoeniuiu Techniki - Partiinuuiu Zabotu." (Party Concern About Learning to Handle Technology) pp 17-23.

In discussing various training techniques being used to educate the troops and speed up the process of their mastering the skills needed to use new equipment and weaponry, the author points out the following problem areas.

- Formalism and mechanical conduct of training.
- Some officers, particularly younger ones, do not carefully prepare themselves for training, do not always effectively use training time, and at times display a lack of concern about the quality and effectiveness of training.
- Organizers forgetting about entire units in contests for selecting outstanding soldiers, a program described as being very popular among the troops.
- Failure to utilize such training aids as films
- Some platoon commanders have artificially raised scores in order to show better results.
- In some units the better soldiers are avoiding their studies/training and local commanders are not actively working to correct this situation.

VOLUME 6

- 1 Colonel S. Nosov "Molodym Propagandistam-Vnimanie i Zabotu." (We must Give Attention and Assistance to Young Propagandists), pp 75-80.

The author, a senior instructor in the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Northern Caucasus Military District, discusses the problems of the leaders of political study groups. In general these leaders are young, inexperienced officers who need the assistance of commanders and senior political officers. In some units this assistance is not being given. Some commanders feel that it is the job of the political organizations. For their part, political departments only perfunctorily work with the young officers. In the units, four hours per week are scheduled for the training of these officers. In some units this time is used ineffectively or in nonsupportive activities. This results in either continued mediocrity or even in a lowering of the effectiveness of the political study leaders.

VOLUME 8

- 1 General Lieutenant of Aviation A. Singaevskii. "Zven'ia Odnoi Tsepi" (Links of a Single Chain), pp 54-59.

In discussing the role of a commander's political deputies in aviation units, the author notes that such officers should be competent pilots as this enables them to more easily and effectively conduct political work among the personnel. Problems have arisen, however, when political deputies have devoted their efforts to improving flying skills and have let other political activities do their work. He cites one example out, the political deputy responded that he was as good a pilot as any in the unit. This response completely disregarded his lack of effort in political work. The author points out that such thinking is not exclusive to this particular officer. He draws attention to the fact that more problems are observed in those units in which young political deputies do not work under the close observation of commanders or senior political officers.

VOLUME 9

- 1 Colonel-General G. Sredin. "Povyshat' Effectivnost' Partiino-Politicheskoi Raboty". (To Raise the Effectiveness of Party Political Work), pp 3-13.

The author, First Deputy to the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, emphasizes the importance of the role that party political work plays in the fulfilling of tasks/missions given to the Army and Navy. To be successful, a well planned program must be developed, aggressively pursued to completion, and then carefully analyzed to identify those areas in which success was achieved or those areas in which continued emphasis is required in order to improve the effectiveness of party political work.

While pointing out that an objective, in-depth analysis will produce an accurate identification of the level of military and political training achieved, he notes that deficiencies still exist in the analysis completed by some political organizations. He specifically identifies the following problem areas:

- Covering up of deficiencies or the exaggeration, overstating or embellishing of actual results.
- The praising of subordinates for imagined successes which produces in them an indifference toward their work.

- Information "from below" at times is not objective, containing excessive emphasis of positive examples of success, avoiding the negative.
- Failure to identify the important facts, note developments, make appropriate conclusions and then work up practical recommendations.
- Information "from above" is sometimes late, does not include a thorough analysis or thought - out recommendations. Often the information is not received by the political organizations which should have it.
- Good intentions remain just that, due to a lack of initiative on the part of some person to take the responsibility for the matter and carry it to a conclusion. On the other hand, it has been noted, that such a person was available to put together plans which repeat earlier approved plans and which make no contribution to the organization of work.

2 General Colonel M. Shapovalov. "V Voennno-Politicheskije VUZy-Dostoinykh". (Send to the Military Political Higher Educational Institutions Only the Deserving), pp 14-20

In this article, the Chief of the Directorate of Cadre of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy criticizes the failure of some subordinate organizations to select capable and worthy officers for instructor positions or candidates for attendance at the higher military educational institutions.

In discussing the deficiencies that still exist in the selection of instructors for these institutions, he points out the following:

- Selection of officers who do not meet requirements of position due to age, party record, personal preparation, and job experience. For these particular persons, every year a certain number of officers are rejected.
- Officers are selected who have low morals and poor work habits. The author specifically points out the Pacific Ocean and Baltic Sea Fleets, and the Baltic Military District as deserving criticism in this area.
- Some political organizations do not maintain lists of qualified, deserving officers and, in fact, dodge such work as conducting personal reviews of candidates to check their qualifications.
- These deficiencies are characteristic of a number of political organs involved in the staffing of the tougher military education institutions.

The following deficiencies are noted regarding the identification and selection of future cadets.

- The Minister of Defense has decreed that priority be given to selection of active duty personnel, as experience shows cadets with such backgrounds have produced the most successful officers. This decree is not being followed and in one instance only twenty-five percent of those accepted at a school were on active duty, and only a very few of those could be considered to be of the high quality desired.
- Personnel files of candidates are being forwarded directly to the education institutions bypassing intermediate political organizations, and consequently, further screening of candidates.
- Medical examinations are not being carefully done as individuals with poor health are being selected for schooling.
- Local military commissariats are failing to properly explain or describe the political officer profession, or the particulars of the work, training and life of cadets.
- Few graphic aids are used to provide information to interested personnel.

The author briefly pointed out deficiencies existing in the organizational structure for selecting personnel.

- Some officers in military districts have only superficial knowledge about the higher institutions and the entrance requirements for them.
- Selection commissions for some of the institutions do not justify their acceptances or rejections for entrance examinations. Furthermore, the commissions sometimes only use grade-point average for acceptance, ignoring the personal qualities of individuals.
- Although required by organizational decree, Komsomol groups are only rarely involved in the selection of candidates for schooling.

3 Vice Admiral M. Ozimov. "V Bor'be za Ustavnoi Poriadok". (In the Struggle for Prescribed Order), pp 40-44.

This article is completely devoted to a discussion of the need for adherence to and enforcement of disciplinary regulations. The author reemphasizes that every officer must be personally involved to insure that order is maintained. However, he notes that some officers only intermittently enforce discipline, allow deviations from regulations, and then overact in an attempt to correct the situation. Such overreaction is ultimately ineffective and failure to continually enforce regulations causes subordinate personnel to question the validity of established procedures. He further states that some staff officers have become over-involved in routine activities, started to consider themselves specialists in a narrow field, and therefore ignore their responsibilities related to maintaining discipline.

One example is described in which the effort of a ship's crew resulted in a disappointing dereliction of duty in several areas of security/control aboard ship. An investigation by members of the political department revealed that little attention had been given to the training of personnel for security/control duty. Due to formalism in briefings, the personnel did not understand what was required of them or how regulations applied. In other cases, sailors assigned to such duty included those with disciplinary problems in the past who failed to exert control or who broke regulations themselves.

The author encouraged commanders to effectively use their political organizations to aid in maintaining discipline, analyzing problem areas and determining measures to be taken to correct a situation.

4. Lieutenant V. Stanovikhin. "Ne Tol'ko Prisutstvovat'." (Not Only be Present), pp 59-62

The author stresses the importance of Komsomol meetings - "The school for educating" - and the impact such a meeting should have on the development of the members. The author, the political officer of a company relates his experiences and emphasizes the need for thorough preparation to facilitate teaching, discussion, and decision - making. He pays particular attention to the preparation of the talk to be given at the meeting so that the educational benefit will be positive and useful and inspire the members to fulfill selected goals. He notes that he has observed reports which were poorly prepared, that sometimes consisted of a collection of trite phrases and predetermined opinions which ruled our discussion or questions. Some speakers have only stated that members "must", "have to", "are required to" "do something", but never explain why it is so. He attacks those who prepare a "scenario" for meetings, determining in advance what will be said, who will say it, and the decisions to be reached. He cautions against formalism in selecting a topic, preparing and presenting a report, and emphasizes that political officers must check and double-check to insure an effective, interesting report is given, and thoroughly discussed before a decision is made concerning objectives to be met in the future.

VOLUME 10

- 1 Lead Article. "Boevoi Ucheba - Vysokoe Kachestvo i Effektivnost'" (High Quality and Effectiveness are Necessary in Military Training), pp 3-8

Although international tension has decreased, the fact that the West has continued the arms race has increased the need for improving the effectiveness of Soviet military training. Due to an astutely organized training-educational system, supported by active party political work, the effectiveness of the armed forces has continued to improve. However, in some units, battalion size and lower, deficiencies in the organization of military and political training still exist and efforts to eliminate these deficiencies are not continuously, actively pursued. An officer is identified as commanding a unit in which the personnel do not care enough to eliminate shortcomings. In other units failure to effectively organize socialist competition is attributed to weak leadership and formalism. It is emphasized that commanders and political workers and organizations must work to eliminate formalism, develop a specific program for increasing effectiveness of training, and create among the personnel an atmosphere in which all will strive for improvement.

- 2 Major Sidorik. "Entuziazm Molodykh - Na Reshenie Vozrosshikh Zadach". (The Enthusiasm of the Young Must be Directed Toward the Fulfilling of Increased Tasks), pp 9-17

An Assistant for Komsomol work, a member of the Staff of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, evaluates the Komsomol program to intensify the Communist education of Soviet youth.

In his discussion concerning ideological preparation of youth, the author notes that a lack of knowledge of Communist ideology on the part of some Komsomol leaders is impeding the educational effort. Further, these leaders are not working to improve their knowledge.

In discussing organizational affairs, several problem areas are identified. Some Komsomol leadership elements just have not proven to be effective, and measures to correct this situation have not been taken. The leadership problem could be partially explained by the statement that in several regiments, in a two-year period, eighty percent of the secretaries of Komsomol organizations and

sixty percent of the secretaries of committees and bureaux were changed. Such extensive replacement has affected continuity and leadership. In some instances, incapable personnel have been retained to give the impression of continuity. In a number of Komsomol organizations, the effort is not firmly related to the tasks of improving political and military training, nor to the service and discipline of young military personnel. Komsomol directives are not being followed in educational programs, and formalism, bureaucratic approaches and boredom are evident in some organizations.

- 3 Colonel F. Fedchenko. "Na Politzaniatiiakh - Maerialy XXV Sezda KPSS." (The Use of Documents of the 25th Party Congress in Political Studies), pp 49-54

The documents of the 25th Party Congress identify the main tasks and determine the content of political and practical training of Soviet military personnel. When they first started using the documents in seminars, some propagandists, especially the young ones, used facts and figures which they could not explain or compare. The principle aims of the Party's internal and foreign policies were insufficiently explained and frequently the material was poorly linked to the tasks of the soldiers. In the conduct of seminars questions were answered inadequately, discussion was sometimes done hurriedly or not at all, and some seminars turned into boring lectures.

VOLUME 11

- 1 Lead Article. "Aktivnye Boitsy Partii". (Aggressive Warriors of the Party), pp 3-8

The aggressive warriors are supposed to be the leaders in the socialist competition within the military. However, in the opinion of the journal, such leadership is not forthcoming due to the shortcomings of Communists of the Army and Navy, who half-heartedly approach their responsibilities.

Communists are failing to achieve the expected goals in training and are not acting in accordance with military discipline. This has been caused by the failure of Party organizations to inculcate high party qualities in all personnel. Intra-party work has weakened, and far from all communists actively participate in such work. Formalism, lack of initiative and lack of objectivity all exist. Some Communists feel no urgency to change and prefer to rely on chance to achieve party goals, rather than systematically developed programs.

2. General Major V. Anikovich. "Kurs - Vysokaia Ideinost' i Deistvennost'." (Toward High Ideological Content and Effectiveness), pp 58-63.

The head of the Department of Culture (Directorate for Propaganda and Agitation of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy) writes of the low level of cultural-educational work in the forces. Various organizations - officers' clubs, unit clubs, cultural institutions, clubs for various amateur groups - are involved in such work, and through various means - lectures, discussion groups, plays, films, etc., - should be effectively utilizing the many successes of the Soviet Union to further educate military personnel of the Army and Navy. This, however, is not the case.

Organizations are described as not being actively involved in such programs, preparing material which is entertaining rather than educational and replacing historically significant material with expressionless depiction of current activity or life.

Some organizations are depicted as being involved in too many activities which results in a dilution of effort and a substandard product or qualitatively low results. In terms of educational value, activities are described as poorly organized, not creatively executed, at times dry and boring, and frequently not at all related to the lives or duties of the military members.

3. Colonel I. Chepurnoi. "Zabota o Metodicheskoi Masterstve Propagandista." (Concern about the Methodological Mastering of Training Techniques by the Propagandist), pp 64-68.

The author, head of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Turkistan Military District, discusses the need for systematic improvement of the training and educational techniques of political cadre. He discusses special conferences in which propaganda cadre discuss "systematic" approaches to training; in-depth analysis of training programs; effective use of graphic aids; and personal efforts which have proven successful. Basically, the "how to" of conducting political training which improves the capability of the political officer.

But, in spite of all the efforts which have been put forth, it is apparent that some officers, particularly

the younger ones, have not grasped the benefits of such knowledge, have not tried to adopt specific measures to improve both their ability and their level of instruction, and, in fact, have not been prepared to effectively conduct training. In the author's opinion, this is all due to a lack of concern on the part of commanders and political workers, who should be assisting, checking, and demanding superior performance from their political cadre.

VOLUME 12

1. Leading Article. "Povysht' Deistvennost' Sotsialisticheskogo Sorevnovaniia." (To Raise the Effectiveness of Socialist Competition), pp 3-8.

Within the Army and the Navy, socialist competition is an integral part of the program of combat training, and is considered the driving force for the raising of the level of effectiveness of training. While it is possible to point out many examples of effective organizations of the competition, the journal notes that formalism and beauracrat thinking in the leadership of such an important program still exists, and decreases the effectiveness of training.

During the last winter training period, due to a poorly organized program, individuals, and thus units, failed to achieve past training results. Commanders and political officers failed to objectively evaluate training progress; did not provide assistance or advice to younger leaders who needed help; and did not advise individual personnel of their progress so they would know how well, or how badly, they were doing.

Additionally, over-simplified approaches to the defining of the results of training tests, or the providing of data beforehand to insure successful completion of training tests provided false indicators of the level of training of individuals and units. The result is that individuals, or units, received outstanding results, but in reality this was due to manipulation and the artificial raising of test scores, and not due to knowledge and ability of individual soldiers.

VOLUME 13

1. Leading Article. "Vazhnyi Uchastok Partiinoi i Sluzhebnoi Deiatel'nosti". (An Important Part of Party and Government Effectiveness), pp 3-7.

At all levels, Soviet governmental and military organizations receive letters containing suggestions, complaints, or personal opinions about various aspects of Soviet life. Frequently these letters contain requests for advice or assistance. The party considers letters from Soviet citizens as a form of communication with the masses. Directives pertaining to the review and handling of letters have been published and Brezhnev himself has stressed the importance of an effective response to letters.

The general tone of the article, perhaps more than the examples of failure to comply with directives, indicates a wide-spread bureaucratic approach to the review and handling of letters, particularly those containing complaints. Some government and military personnel consider such work to be beyond the scope of their job requirements, and an infringement upon their areas of responsibility. The practice of routing letters from department to department until it is lost or given a standard bureaucratic response is given particular attention. Within the military, a system and procedures for handling personal problems have been established. Some commanders do not adhere to the system or pass problems on to others who do not have the authority to solve the problems. In a number of units, personnel are not told what privileges they have, nor how these pertain to their families.

The party considers the proper handling of letters as part of the process of educating the masses, but apparently has not been able to overcome bureaucratic thinking and inertia in this area.

2. General Lieutenant K. Maksimov. "Kommunisty i Polevaia Vyuchka" (Communists and Field Training), pp 30-36

General Maksimov, head of the Political Directorate and member of the Military Council of the Soviet Central Group of Forces, points out that due to full and rational use of time and intensification of the training program within the group, highly effective training has been achieved. This success was due in part to the strong support given to commanders by group political workers and organizations. Political training was well integrated and scheduled so as to apply to the particular training

the forces were undergoing. It is in field training, and ultimately in combat, that communists can best provide support to the commander in that he cannot always get to every unit or talk with the troops due to the demands of the situation. Communists can fill this gap by setting the example and providing encouragement and moral leadership. A very important role in this effort belongs to the commander's deputy for political work. If he successfully organizes and conducts the political training, this will significantly enhance the opportunity for success in training or combat operations. But it is in the area of the capability of these deputies that problems are noticeable, particularly among the young political officers whose contributions to field training have been of low quality. Because they generally are young and inexperienced, commanders must provide guidance, advice, and work to develop them into effective political officers. Senior political officers must provide the benefit of their experience and check to insure that the training program is effectively organized and integrated with field training. Apparently, commanders or political officers of some units are not taking such measures. Some commanders transfer young political officers who make mistakes, rather than work to train them. The result is that the young officer continues to produce low quality work and the commander loses a potentially vital member of his unit. Neither situation is acceptable and commanders and senior political officers must pay more attention to training young political officers.

3. General Major V. Soshnev. "Vazhneishaia Chast' Organizatorskoi Raboty." (An Extremely Important Part of Organizational Work), pp 37-44.

One of the most important activities of political organizations is the control and check of the execution of work. While generally crediting party organizations with making good decisions, the author states they are failing in the execution of the decisions. This is due to a lack of organization of the work to be done, a failure to exert the necessary pressure to insure it is done and done well, an overreliance on specialists who may or may not do their job, and a failure to hold individuals personally responsible for their work. Some party organizations are taking a proforma approach to control, and only taking some action when deficiencies are revealed. Checks of work in progress are sporadic and superficial. Having identified these deficiencies, General Soshnev gives a brief review of some management techniques in which systematic planning and control with continuous checks are emphasized for insuring that work is successfully completed.

VOLUME 14

1. Admiral V. Maslov (Commander, Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet). "Boevaia Vyuchka Korabel'nogo Ekipazha." (Combat Training of the Naval Crew), pp 30-36

Success in naval battles depends not only on the commander's knowledge of tactics, but also on the realistic combat and sea training of the crews and the high combat preparedness which such training produces. While successes in the area of crew training have been achieved, deficiencies in the combat preparations of some crews of the Pacific fleet still exist. Some commanders believe that a cruise in itself is an indicator of training and performance is only mediocre. Some staffs are only interested in controlling the training process, ignoring the content, or insuring that equipment is in working condition. At times there is a lack of coordination between staffs and the political organs. This leads to either a duplication or diffusion of effort. Many of the commanders are young and need the constant guidance and assistance of senior officers. The above deficiencies are affecting the combat preparedness of the fleet. Direct and objective control of the program is necessary to produce effective training and increased preparedness.

2. Colonel V. Koniaev. "Molodym - Vnimanie i Zabotu." (We must Devote our Attention and Concern to the Young), pp 49-53.

In his article, the author draws attention to the fact that some Komsomol organizations are accepting new members who, for reasons pertaining to personal morals, lack of self-discipline and disregard for military discipline, should not be taken into the organization. This is attributed to an overzealous recruiting effort in which prospective members are not objectively evaluated nor their activities in the unit thoroughly investigated. The Komsomols should work with all young servicemen, but should seek to bring into the organization only the finest soldiers, not the unqualified.

3. General Lieutenant I. Blizniuk (Chief of the Political Department of the Airborne Forces). "Istochnik Vdokhnoveniia." (Source of Inspiration), pp 54-59.

The hard-earned successes of the people of the Soviet Union serve as a source of inspiration for all servicemen. Examples of the fruitful strivings of the people are used by commanders and all political organizations for instilling in the forces pride in their homeland and its achievements. However, not all comrades are effectively capitalizing on the boundless possibility for educating the young servicemen. At times the examples used in lectures and discussions do not clearly describe the greatness of the heroic labor of the people and thus fail to inculcate a sense of responsibility and moral awareness of the importance of their duties in the minds of the soldiers. This higher state of consciousness will cause them to seek greater perfection and achievements in their military training and service.

VOLUME 15

1. Leading Article. "Sila Partiinogo Vliianiia." (The Force of Party Influence), pp 3-8.

The Party affects all aspects of life and it is Party influence on the masses, on the fulfillment of plans and on the strengthening of economic and military power which leads to the solving of problems and the achieving of goals. In the military, the influence is insured by commanders, political workers and Party organizations. Influence is being weakened, however, by deficiencies which exist in individual and organizational work. Political programs are poorly organized. This is sometimes covered up by inflating actual results. Some organizations tend to equate discussing a problem with having solved it. Concrete steps to solve the problem are either not presented or else not carried out. Due to a lack of contact with the masses, some political organizations have only superficial knowledge of the situation in the unit. Criticism is being misdirected toward the organization and not the responsible individual.

The result of such deficiencies is a weakening, a lessening of Party influence. To be effective, Party work must be organized and based on thorough knowledge of Party life in the unit. Once decisions are made, instructions must be specific, not extremely general, and checks must be made to insure compliance.

2. General Major B. Utkin. "Obucheniui i Vospitaniui Praporshchikov - Partiinui Zabotu." (Party Concern Must be Emphasized in the Training and Educating of "Warrant Officers"), pp 23-29

General Utkin, a member of the Military Council and head of the Political Directorate of the Volga Military District, emphasizes the continuing need and responsibility of leaders at all levels to develop the new "warrant officers", that group of specialists whose rank places them between the noncommissioned officer and officer corps.

There are problems in the area of professional development which require priority attention, and in the area of moral-political and ideological preparation, which requires close attention. His concern was brought about by evidence of a lack of professional knowledge, particularly among the junior "warrant officers", and indications of irresponsibility in the group as a whole.

3. Captain N. Iaushev. "S Prisushchei Kommunistam Samokritichnost'iu." (With the Attitude of Self-criticism Inherent in Communists), pp 44-48

In a letter to the journal, the author, a regimental staff officer, discusses the lack of self-criticism and the misuse or lack of criticism. In his opinion, self-criticism occurs only rarely, frequently lacks content, and appears to be a mechanical act done to meet Party requirements.

Criticism directed toward the work of elected Party organs or the unacceptable conduct of individuals is rarely heard. Too often such deficiencies are ignored or covered up by other Communists. At times criticism is used to slander other Communists, directed at the unidentified "they", or consists of a stream of insulting statements which are not supported by fact.

4. Captain N. Koshelev. "Byt' Blizhe k Molodezhi." (To be Closer to Young People), pp 49-51.

This article is based on notes taken from a conference in which effective utilization of Komsomol organization was discussed. The basic concern was how to direct the efforts and energy of the Komsomols. During the conference the problem areas were brought up and discussed.

The main problem relates to a lack of interaction between communist leaders and the Komsomols. Some individuals consider the educating of youth to be a secondary

issue, not a primary requirement of their job. As a result they tend to ignore the Komsomols, are too busy to meet with them or to try to help them. The result is that Komsomol organizations are not provided specific goals to work toward, and do not know those areas in which they can best provide assistance to the commander. However, if, due to a lack of direction, the efforts go astray, the same leaders quickly point to the disorganized effort and the lack of Komsomol assistance.

The need for greater leadership involvement in Komsomol activities is supported by the fact that all too frequently the decisions of the organization are not followed up by action, or due to inadequate control produce only mediocre results. In one unit, the most active Komsomol group included members who violated military discipline and who were poor examples in their service and in training. Greater involvement by local leaders in Komsomol affairs could have insured that only the best soldiers entered the organizations.

Local Party organizations were involved in numerous activities, but little thought was being given to the quality of the effort as quantity was of more concern. It was noted that such an effort served as a poor example for the Komsomol organizations.

Komsomol organizations can provide great assistance to commanders, but only when there is personal interest in the organization and its activities, and specific rather than general direction is provided.

VOLUME 16

1. General Major V. Silakov. "Serzhanty - Nadezhnaia Opora Ofitserov." (Sergeants - the Reliable Assistants of Officers), pp 42-47

The author discusses the importance of sergeants in training process and emphasizes the need for continuous development of these junior leaders. Commanders, particularly, and political workers should provide support and assistance to expand the knowledge of the sergeants and affect the continued development of their political and military expertise.

General Silakov identifies two related problem areas as regards the work and training of the noncommissioned officers, particularly the younger or junior sergeants. The first problem area relates to a lack of leadership skills on the part of some younger NCO's, who are unable to establish effective relationships with their subordinates. This inability causes them to use threats or passive agreements as the means of effecting leadership. Both methods ultimately prove unsuccessful.

The second area concerns the lack of effort of some commanders to further develop the skills of the younger NCO's. Some commanders believe that once a young sergeant has been through the NCO training program, he needs no further training or help. However, these training programs do not teach the young sergeant all the leadership skills he will need in the future. These must be developed through daily interaction with his subordinates and the continuous assistance and training by commanders.

It was pointed out that in some units the Komsomol organizations organized training programs to help the young NCO's develop their political and military skills. The author's continued emphasis that commanders and political workers pay particular attention to the development of the younger, sergeants indicates leadership problems exist at the lower levels, particularly at squad level.

2. Sergeant M. Kholod. "Opiat' Zapisali - 'Uluchshit'." (Again They Write - To Improve.....), pp 61-64

During his report to the 25th Party Congress, in his remarks concerning the Komsomol Organization, Brezhnev included a statement about the existence of formalism and bureaucratic approaches to educational work with youth. The author, who describes himself as a Komsomol member whose record or experience is not great, discusses some shortcomings in his organization, but directs his attention to suggestions "to improve" the organization. A planned, systematic training program to provide Komsomol members the leadership skills needed to work with people does not exist. Party members responsible for working with the organization sometimes do not even put in an appearance to see how affairs are going or if assistance is needed. Party members get so wrapped up in their work that they completely forget about the Komsomol organization. The author points out that if the organization is to improve, it must be shown "how to", and this must be done by experienced political and military leaders.

VOLUME 17

1. Leading Article. "Beri s Kommunistu Primer." (Take the Example from the Communist), pp 3-8.

This is a propaganda article directed at the Komsomol organization. It extols the examples which have been set by Communists in various endeavors and summons the Komsomols to follow such examples in living their Komsomol life and performing their duties. In the article, two problem areas are noted and briefly discussed.

The first pertains to an excessive fervor which causes the organization to jump from project to project without fully completing any of them. A concrete solution to this problem is suggested. Communists have to provide direction to the Komsomols to insure that efforts are channelized and that established projects are completed before new ones are started. The second problem area relates to letters from Komsomol members who complain about the poor work of their local organization and about the many members who do nothing or very little. In its response, the journal attributes this to a lack of initiative and urges each Komsomol member to work to his utmost. This urging is couched in appeals such as "Live and struggle as Lenin did". This is a very idealistic response and appears as a bureaucratic response to a problem.

2. Colonel of Justice I. Gordienko. "Vospitanie Otvestvennosti". (Teaching of Responsibility), pp 35-41.

Although writing about developing responsibility in soldiers, the author also gives a review of some leadership principles as he notes irresponsible actions of commanders and how they impact upon the teaching of responsibility. The author points out that commanders inflate results, conceal misdeeds, abuse their command authority, or don't use it at all, demonstrate passiveness or indifference toward professional growth of themselves or subordinates, and tend to place more emphasis on physical training than on the instilling of responsibility in the individual soldier.

3. General Colonel I. Mednikov. "Na Perednem Krae v Gushche Mass." (On the Main Line of Defense in the Midst of the Masses), pp 41-49

The author, a member of the Military Council and head of the Political Directorate of GSFG, is concerned with the strengthening of local party organizations and increasing their activeness and alertness in the intensification of their assistance to the leadership within GSFG. The military detachments of the Communist Party are the local organizations of the Army and the Navy. General Mednikov writes about the work of these detachments in the GSFG, particularly how their efforts should assist in the perfecting of military training. In a review of the situation, the author notes that not all of these party organizations are functioning as they should.

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Some of the organizations have a weak understanding of military training and even display "liberalism" and "tolerance" of low quality training. Some of the organizations only timidly get involved in staff studies concerned with military preparedness, functions and methods of command, special training and development of officers, and questions about general staff work. Some individual communists-commanders, political officers, officers, rarely attend local party activities and do not know the needs and interests of their fellow communists.

The author notes that such problems are affected by turnovers in local party organization secretaries. Each year 50-55% of these secretaries are replaced. As a result, some 70% of the secretaries are overly involved in organizational duties and do not have sufficient time to devote to assisting the commander.

In a related area, it is noted that requirements for party membership have been lowered. Individuals are being brought directly into the party and are not given a period as a candidate during which they can be tested and further evaluated. Criticism has taken on a low quality, characterized by general criticisms of the faceless "They".

The General concludes that the sooner local organizations begin to manage these problems, the sooner they will make a valuable contribution to the strengthening of the defensive power of the Forces of GSFG.

VOLUME 18

1. General Lieutenant M. Ponomarev. "Byt Voennogo Gorodka." (Life on a Military Installation), pp 19-25.

Party programs for improving the life of the Soviet people have produced similar efforts within the armed forces. This is taking place in the form of improving the material-technological base of military installations and in the construction of modern barracks, messhalls, medical facilities and other facilities designed to improve the life of the Soviet professional military.

The author, Deputy Chief of the Rear of the Soviet Armed Forces, is a frequent visitor to Soviet military installations. In this article he identifies deficiencies in the maintenance and construction of facilities.

Maintenance in some installations is poor or almost nonexistent, which the author attributes to a lack of concern on the part of local commanders and political workers. Funds and materials specifically identified for maintenance programs are being misused or wastefully utilized.

Military shopping facilities are still experiencing shortages of items of everyday use. Funds designated for the development of these facilities are not being properly spent. Capital investment for such stores has been underestimated in some commands. The problem has been compounded by the selection of unqualified personnel to manage the operation of the stores.

In programs for construction of new facilities, irresponsibility has resulted in the misuse of, or failure to use at all, the monies allocated. Quality remains a problem in that repairs have to be made almost immediately after buildings are put into use.

Such deficiencies indicate a lack of concern for subordinates by military and political leaders. In the opinion of the author, such disinterest will be reflected in the subordinates' approach to training, which will ultimately affect the preparedness of the unit.

2. General Colonel I. Gerasimov. "Metodicheskoe Masterstvo Molodogo Offitsera." (Methodical Training of the Young Officer), pp 26-32

Young officers who have only recently left the military schools are well versed in theory, but are weak in the practical application of theory to the common problems which daily confront them in their military duties. The commander of the forces of the Military District of Kiev discusses the problem and the need for commanders to maintain a systematic program for developing the skills needed by Soviet officers. Such a program is designed to insure that young officers are given the benefit of the experience and knowledge of senior officers, and to expand their knowledge and their ability to lead and train the Soviet soldier. Emphasis is placed on developing the ability to effectively train and educate their soldiers and to teach the young officers methodology used in training and educating. This article is directed toward senior officers and identifies problem areas which the author has observed.

Some commanders do not possess the knowledge needed to teach young officers. These commanders follow old methods and have not adapted to the technological changes which have taken place in Soviet equipment. Other commanders find individual work with young officers too demanding and instead conduct conferences and general discussions which impart little knowledge. Other commanders oversupervise their young officers and do not give them the opportunity to test or prove themselves. At times they replace them with senior officers to insure that everything goes right.

3. Colonel V. Makarov. "Ob Ideinoi Zakalke Praporshchikov." (On the Ideological Tempering of "Warrant Officers"), pp. 58-63

The Soviet Army "Warrant Officer" has very quickly been assigned to various duties, including command, staff, and training. The author, Deputy Chief of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Political Directorate of the Soviet Ground Forces, pays particular attention to the training of this group and points out deficiencies that exist in the training.

Since they will be involved in educating Soviet soldiers, particular attention must be given to developing the "warrant officers" knowledge of ideology, and how it relates to decisions and statements of the Party, and their ability to include and explain such actions when teaching. However, the political training of this special category of personnel suffers due to poor ideological content, poor instructional techniques, and low attendance by the students.

On their part, the "warrant officers" have failed to read the recommended literature which they and their students all use, failed to participate in political discussions and seminars on new Party documents and decisions, and have shown little initiative toward independent study and self-improvement. In one unit, one-half of the "warrants" have never registered with the library, an excellent source of material for self-study or for use in teaching. It is not considered surprising that some of them have been unsuccessful in their work, have not conducted themselves properly, and have shown that they are undisciplined.

VOLUME 20

1. Lead Article. "Za Vysokuiu Effektivnost' Politicheskoi Ucheby." (For High Effectiveness in Political Training). pp 3-9.

In its lead article, the Journal calls for greater effectiveness in political training. The achieving of the goal of raising the level of combat preparedness depends on the activities of the political and military organizational structure within the Soviet Army and Navy. In some units the effort is not sufficient to meet growing demands. These units demonstrate little concern for the ideological training of the troops. Cadre do not have a thorough understanding of the material used in training and cannot relate the information to the actual life of the military members. Some commanders and political workers give little attention to individual educational work with personnel, do not identify the interests of their people, and fail to recognize that

present service personnel possess a higher educational level. The success of ideological-political training is determined by the knowledge, interest, and activities of leadership cadre. Such deficiencies as mentioned above will not, in the thinking of the journal, lend to success and must be replaced by an improved, effective program of training.

2. General Major N. Shevkun, "Partiinyi Aktiv: Ego Vyrashchivanie i Vospitanie." (The Party Activist: His Training and Education), pp 46-53

The energy, effort and work of the Party activist is a driving power in the achieving of established goals. Commanders, political workers, members of the Party and candidates for membership can all be considered to be activists. But in reality only the most politically active of this group deserve to be called a Party activist.

It is apparent that not all Communists deserve to be so identified. The author has observed in his military district that some Communists in leadership positions are only infrequently active in Party meetings or political training. Some political workers occupy themselves with paperwork and avoid activities which require direct contact with people. Political organs in some units display a tendency to talk about new programs, but take no action to carry out their ideas. This could possibly explain why some political organizations are not very actively working to improving field training or in the leadership training of officers. At times, Communists condone defects in political work, display a lack of discipline, and violate Party standards of conduct.

Without going into detail, the author states that attention must be shown to young officers. This is described in terms of senior, experienced officers helping them whenever and however possible.

3. Senior Lieutenant V. Vasiuk. "Impul's Delam Initsiativnym." (To Provide the Impetus for Initiative), pp 54-56

Writing in reference to an earlier article concerning the Komsomol organization ("To be closer to Youth"), The author emphasizes the need of the organization for guidance and assistance from senior communists. Too often officers do not have the time or interest to work with the Komsomols. Without assistance and guidance the organization flounders while attempting to organize programs to assist the commander. Programs are unsuccessful due to a diffusion of effort. Communists should take the time to work with the Komson to provide the direction and impetus to effective action by the organization.

4. Captain 2d Rank I. Kovalenko. "Ot Poznaniia k Deistviu." (From Theory to Action), pp 57-61.

This article concerns the work of a Party night school and the naval students who attend it. The author appears to be quite satisfied with the effort of the school, and its instructors, and course content, which are designed to improve the technical knowledge of service personnel. But the author finds fault with some of the students. These students do not seriously study basic sources, copy material rather than analyzing and learning it, and do not link the instruction to their military duties.

VOLUME 21

1. General Colonel of Aviation B. Bochkov. "Masterski Vladet' Boevoi Tehnikoe." (To Skillfully Master Military Technology), pp 31-37

To insure that the Soviet military is equipped to meet aggression from the West, new equipment and weaponry incorporating the latest technology is being given to the military. The forces must be properly trained to acquire the necessary knowledge and skill to effectively use such equipment. The Soviet Army has reworked its manuals to include the data needed for complex training programs, and spends considerable time studying the problem of how to insure that new technology and weaponry are mastered by the troops.

In spite of efforts to refine the training program, and the emphasis given to updating methodology, some basic problems continue to exist in the Moscow Air Defense District. The author, Commander of Forces of the District, states that some commanders, staffs, political and Komsomol organizations have not reorganized their work to meet new demands. There is ineffective use of training time and insufficient training of officers and NCOs. Encouragement and demands for excellence in training are not always present.

2. General Major A. Overchuk. "Partiinoe Sobranie." (The Party Meeting), pp 43-51.

In the Trans-Caucasus Military District, a review of the activities of Party meetings was conducted and then analyzed. In this article, the Chief of the Political Directorate of the District discusses the following deficiencies, which were revealed by the analysis,

-discussion frequently centers around unimportant questions, administrative requirements, or the mechanics of doing something. This is done to the detriment of significant problems,

-there is duplication of effort in that Party organizations review material which has already been discussed at Party meetings,

-some problems are given so much emphasis that other problems which merit attention are neglected,

-in a number of units, in reaching a decision, concrete measures to insure completion of plans, such as designating specific dates for completion, means for accomplishing them, individual overall responsibility, were not addressed. As a consequence, plans were not carried through to completion.

-There is extensive discussion of problems, but no action is taken to solve them,

-Criticism is directed toward the faceless "he, they" and has no value. A review of criticism conducted in one Party organization revealed that only in one out of five such speeches was there concrete identification of the person toward whom the criticism was directed.

-Some Party meetings are poorly organized and are boring. It is considered that such poor organization reflects the overall effort of these Party organs.

3. Major A. Repka. "Poruchite Eto Mne." (Assign that Task to Me), pp 52-56.

"Assign that task to me" should be the personal slogan of each Komsomol member as by doing practical work, a man is educated, grows, and strengthens his organizational abilities. Failure of Komsomol leaders to assign tasks as they arise and a lack of initiative by members are the reasons some Komsomol organizations function ineffectively. Beyond describing such an organization and stating that it accomplished little or nothing, the author provides no concrete suggestions as to what must be done in a situation where neither the leadership nor the membership will take the initiative to get things done.

4. Captain 1st Rank Iu. Kucherov. "Rozhdennoe Initsiativoi." (Born Through Initiative), pp 57-62.

The cultural-educational institutions of the military, the unit and officer clubs, play an important role in ideological-educational work. The activities presented in the clubs - plays, readings, films, exhibitions, and other cultural affairs - are propaganda designed to effect the moral and aesthetic education of military personnel and their interrelationship with and within the collective. To be successful, these activities need the full support of commanders and political organizations. It was noted that in a particular political department, little attention was given to the activities in the unit club. Representatives of the department went to the club only when required. They did not fully cooperate with nor provide assistance to the club manager. In a general statement about improving the effectiveness of this type work, it was noted that further development of the content, form and methods of presentation is required, particularly in the activities in the officer clubs.

VOLUME 22

1. Leading Article. "Edinstvo Slova i Dela." (Unity of Word and Deed), pp 3-8

In the article, unity of word and deed is defined as a "durable fusion of Communist beliefs and Communist actions; an unwavering following of the Communist principles of Life." In the military this translates as setting a personal example in the execution of duty, and care about the raising of combat preparedness. Most members of the military are in fact following these ideas, but there are those who know the basic principles but do not always observe them. In an aviation unit, this neglect of established standards has appeared in the form of complacency and disregard for equipment and its proper use. The problem has not been corrected by the unit Party Committee which has failed to exercise proper control.

The tone of the article is that while such deviations by military personnel are very serious, the actual problem pertains to Party control, or in this instance, the apparent lack of it. Control is a very important part of organizational, that is, Party work. It is the business of every leader, every Party organ and it is a reliable route to the correcting of those who do not fill their obligations.

2. Vice Admiral A. Sorokin. "Novye Rubezhi Ideologicheskoi Raboty v Voenno-Uchebnykh Zavedeniakh" (New Frontiers of Ideological Work in the Military Education Institutions), pp 9-19

Ideological educational work is designed to increase patriotism, pride in the homeland, and a readiness to defend the achievements of Socialism. The process of educating people should go hand-in-hand with the process of educating them as Communists. In this dual process, a special role belongs to the Social Science Departments of the military institutions. Greater effort is needed in the area of ideological education, new frontiers must be established. The Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate identifies deficiencies which still exist and which indicate a low level of teaching in the Social Science Departments in the military institutions.

A specific goal of military education is to increase the ability of future officers to conduct independent study. Some teachers, however, are not requiring that students sufficiently study basic political-ideological sources. Teachers still present fundamental theory in a stereotyped manner which is unconvincing and does not relate theory to the actual problems and building of Communism. Seminars are boring and, with the knowledge of the teachers, students copy material which they then read in seminars. In lectures it has been noted that some teachers try to cram in excessive material and only infrequently raise perplexing, difficult questions to stimulate the thinking of the students.

An analysis of the scientific output for the period 1971-1975 reveals that works are still coming out which are only weakly connected to the problems of educating military cadre or have little to do with the life and interests of military personnel. Scientific research has not risen to meet current demands. There has been too much emphasis on publishing rather than on teaching or research related to military education.

In the author's opinion, the overall effort must be improved in the military institutions as they are educating future officers. A Soviet officer is more than a specialist in our area, he is the bearer of Party policy in the armed forces and the authoritative teacher of his subordinates.

3. General-Major V. Komissarov. "Delo Nashe, Partiinoe." (It is ours, the Party Affair), pp 51-58

When commanders and political organizations, as some are doing in the Moscow Military District, show little interest in the activities of the Komsomol organization, do not control the efforts of the organization, nor actively support it, it is to be expected that the organization will not function effectively.

In the opinion of the author, in this military district the main problem is that of improving Party leadership of the Komsomol organization. It is not a problem of a lack of interest on the part of Komsomol members. It arises due to a lack of guidance and support by Party workers and commanders. Support and guidance of the Party, of all its cadre, are needed to properly develop Soviet youth, the future builders of Socialism.

VOLUME 23

1. Leading Article "Mnozhit' Uspekhi v Boevoi i Politicheskoi Uchebe." (To Increase Successes in Military and Political Training), pp 3-8.

Additional successes in the new training year will require elimination of existing flaws in military training. One of the flaws is a combination of complacency and an easing of training conditions by commanders who view the international situation, particularly relations between the USA and the USSR, as one in which no threat of war exists. Such thinking is affecting the training of not only the basic soldier, but also of officers, whose continued development is required. "Many commanders of units below regiment do not possess the necessary practical skills" for command. Further, these deficiencies are being tolerated by some Party organizations. The journal argues that while relations with the West have improved, its aggressive intentions remain as they have been in the past. Training must therefore continue to reflect this threat and complacency eliminated if improved combat preparedness is to be achieved.

2. General-Major N. Smorigo. "Kompleksnyi Podkhod k Vospitaniyu." (A Complex Approach to Education), pp 9-20.

The building of Communism requires the continual all-round development of the Soviet citizen. Ideological-educational work requires a comprehensive, systematic, unified program of instruction to achieve its goal. In discussing the application of such a program, General Smorigo makes the following observations. An analysis of the ideological-educational work, in various political departments and units, reveals that planning and coordination of such work is sometimes inadequate. The effort is insufficiently related to immediate tasks and consists of a number of unrelated measures in which a specific objective for the course of instruction cannot be identified. Lack of experience on the part of individual political workers and propagandists is given as a reason for this flaw. Coordination of ideological training with military training is not always achieved, and planning for coordination of educational work does not always consider the interests of various categories of service personnel, or an individual unit's specific needs.

3. General Lieutenant A. Debaliuk. "Kritika i Samokritika - Neotemlemaia Cherta Partiinoi Zhizni." (Criticism and Self-criticism - An Integral Feature of Party Life), pp 55-62.

Criticism, the identifying of deficiencies, and self-criticism, the evaluating of one's own effort, receive a great deal of attention by the Party. It is a tool used to identify deficiencies which the Party can then take action to eliminate. In his discussion of this procedure, the Chief of the District's Political Directorate points out problems which relate to the conduct of criticism in the Byelorussian Military District.

Party meetings should be conducted so as to create an atmosphere which encourages criticism. This is not occurring in several of the District's Party organizations. Complacency and a lack of objective evaluation of results achieved are defects which can be found in local Party organizations. Only infrequently are mistakes and omissions in Party or military work discussed and analyzed in a business-like manner. Errors or dereliction of duty on the part of local Party leaders are rarely discussed, and then with little objectivity. Some Party committees organize their meetings in advance so as to preclude criticism or limit identification or discussion of deficiencies.

Individual communists are overly cautious in meetings. They either say nothing or insure that nothing they say can result in criticism directed at them. Letters from service personnel to the Political Directorate frequently include statements about deficiencies which exist in their units. In a number of units, complacency and formalism preclude the elimination of deficiencies. In some Party organs, due to poor leadership, plans are not implemented, nor are decisions followed up by action.

4. General Lieutenant L. Fil'chenko. "Partiinost' - Nauchnaia Osnova Prepodavaniia." ("Partiness" - the Scientific Basis of Teaching), pp 63-70.

In discussing the ideological - educational work done in one of the highest level Air Force academies, the author, an assistant professor, devotes particular attention to the subject of "partiness" of the teachers and also identifies problems related to the methodology of teaching.

In the area of "partiness", he states that some teachers have an oversimplified and narrowminded understanding of this principle and therefore do not fully utilize it in their teaching. Material presented is not thoroughly related to the problems involved in the building of Communism, nor to the missions of the Armed Forces. Individual instructors do not give sufficient attention to the denouncing of the aggressive essence of imperialism, or to the criticizing of the views of bourgeois science. At other times their criticisms are limited due to an unscientific approach, illogical arguments and an inaccurate political assessment of a given situation. The interrelationship of knowledge and skill to the level of ideological preparedness of military personnel is not always presented. Too frequently only the importance of military knowledge and ability in a particular skill is emphasized.

In the discussion of methodology, the author states that teachers do not fully utilize the experiences of contemporary local wars to illustrate teaching points. Seminars are boring and ineffective due to their content. At times teachers attempt to cover too much material within the time available. This cannot be done and lessens the value of the instruction.

* Utechin, S.V. A Concise Encyclopedia of Russia. E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc. New York, 1964. p. 406. "Partiness" is defined as "The principle of placing the interests of the Party (whatever they may be at any given moment) above any other interests in all spheres of activity."

VOLUME 24

1. General Colonel G. Salmanov. "Povyshat' Kachestvo Kompleksnykh Zaniatii." (To Raise the Quality of Complex Training), pp 30-35.

The equipping of the forces with advanced weaponry and equipment has led to increased specialization. The interests of combat preparedness, however, require that units with various specialties possess the skills needed for combined-arms operations. The most effective means for solving this problem is complex training, which consists of two basic parts. The first relates to the training conducted by separate branches to develop the skills needed to carry out their particular missions. The second part is the integration of units of various branches in tactical training so as to insure that the coordination and skills needed to carry out common missions are developed. This aspect of the overall training also emphasizes staff coordination and command and control of units in a combat situation.

Precise planning is necessary to insure the success of complex training, to include the relating of political training to military training and missions. It is in the area of planning in which deficiencies have been identified. General Salmanov, Deputy to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces for Combat Training, states that some commanders do not devote sufficient attention to planning. An examination of the forces of the Baltic and Odessa Military Districts revealed that in a number of units, battalion and lower, planning is carelessly done. The result is that the quality of training is low and will not provide the skills needed before combined arms training can be initiated. Several political organizations have tolerated these deficiencies and have not assisted commanders in the organization of effective training.

2. Major A. Bulgakov. "V Partiiu - Tol'ko Dostoinykh." (Accept Only the Worthy into the Party), pp 52-58.

Only the best of the best are worthy of being accepted into the Party. The Secretary of the Party Committee reviews the acceptance procedures in his squadron and notes that they frequently fail to meet the demands of the Party. Facts which would cause rejection of an individual's application are concealed by Party members who give written recommendations and also by those who verbally support the individual. Non-Party members frequently are not given an opportunity to comment on a fellow-soldier who is seeking membership into the Party.

In their haste to approve individuals for candidate status, Party organizations do not thoroughly investigate the personal characteristics of the applicant, but rely only upon his personnel records. In some Party organizations there is no organized program in which the candidate is required to work to improve his political-theoretical knowledge or to test his worthiness. Those in candidate status guilty of some wrongdoing are not immediately corrected or reprimanded. In some units, members of Party Committees do not actively participate in the selection or acceptance of individuals for candidate status. All these deficiencies have resulted in individuals being selected as candidates who then have to be rejected due to actions on their part while in candidate status.

3. Major V. Zakharov. "Sport-Krovnoe Delo Komsomol'tsev." (Sports - A Vital Concern of Komsomol Members), pp 59-64.

Sport programs provide a means for improving the physical conditioning of the participants, for developing skills and discipline which can be related to military duties, and for preparing individuals to represent the Soviet Union in international competition. Komsomol members are very active in sports, both as participants and as organizers of sporting programs in their units. A subject of special concern of the Komsomol, organization is the development in sportsmen of a sense of Soviet patriotism and love for their socialist homeland. The author states that some Komsomol organizations do not fully utilize their opportunities for conducting political work in sporting organizations. They do not display sufficient concern for raising the ideological level of sportsmen, or for the improving of skills required to master a particular sport. At times, Komsomol programs directed at bringing people into sports programs are poorly thought out, do not include a personal approach, and are therefore ineffective.

4. Major Ivanushko. "V Chasy Samostoiatel'noi Podgotovki." (In the Hours of Independent Preparation), pp 65-69.

The work of propagandists requires continuous expansion of their knowledge. Much of this effort is accomplished by independent study in the time scheduled or during an individual's free time. The author states that some of his regiment's propagandists approach this requirement with cold formalism, do little or nothing to prepare themselves, or read a prepared text to the students, and, in general, conduct instruction which is of little ideological value.